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SURROGACY AND PARENTHOOD:
A EUROPEAN SAGA OF GENETIC
ESSENTIALISM AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION
élanie evy*
ABSTRACT
This paper tells a story of shifting normativities, from
tradition to modernity and back, regarding the recognition of legal
parenthood in non-traditional families created through crossborder surrogacy. The cross-border nature of the surrogacy is often
forced as most domestic legal frameworks in Europe still restrict the
creation of non-traditional families through assisted reproductive
technologies. Once back home, these families struggle to have birth
certificates recognized and establish legal parenthood. The
disjuncture between social reality and domestic law creates a
situation of legal limbo. In its recent case law, the European Court
of Human Rights has pushed for domestic authorities to rectify this
situation but, at the same time, has filled the legal limbo with
genetic essentialism and allowed for gender discrimination when
recognizing legal parenthood. While giving full effect to a genetic
father’s foreign birth certificate based on identity and best interests
arguments, the Court accepts that a genetic mother must adopt to
establish a legal parent-child relationship. The paper critically
addresses this intriguing imbalance. It deconstructs the Court’s
genetic essentialism encouraging a biologically determined view of
parenting, which sidelines the social (i.e., non-genetically related)
parent and contradicts the purpose of assisted reproduction to
overcome biological barriers. The paper concludes by rejecting the
gender-discriminatory element of power and control over legal
motherhood imposed by the procedural step of adoption.
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Legal parenthood “goes to the most fundamental aspects of status and,
transcending even status, to the very identity of the child as a human being.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Family law and the regulation of assisted reproduction are areas in
which new technologies highlight the state’s power to define legal
concepts, rendering public the intimately private affair of baby and family
making. 2 In European 3 domestic legal frameworks, sexual orientation,
civil status, and access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are
closely linked. 4 Family law and ART regulation built on arguments of
bionormativity 5 impose restrictions on non-traditional family creation. 6

1. Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC (Fam) 3135 [54] (Eng.).
2. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby
Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 835 (2000) [hereinafter Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making]; Douglas
NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 260 (2017) [hereinafter NeJaime,
Nature of Parenthood]; ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS: FAMILY, STATE, AND
RELATIONAL THEORY (2008); DAPHNA HACKER, LEGALIZED FAMILIES IN THE ERA OF
BORDERED GLOBALIZATION (2017).
3. The paper’s analysis is limited to the forty-seven Member States of the Council of
Europe, which are under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
through their ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights. See
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, [https://perma.cc/N3XP-9E4U].
4. See generally ALICE MARGARIA, THE CONSTRUCTION OF FATHERHOOD: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2019); Sasha
Roseneil et al., Changing Landscapes of Heteronormativity: The Regulation and
Normalization of Same-Sex Sexualities in Europe, 20(2) SOC. POLS. 165 (2013)
[hereinafter Roseneil et al.]; Katarina Trimmings & Paul Reid Beaumont, in Parentage
and Surrogacy in a European Perspective, 3 EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW 232 (2016).
5. Bionormativity entails the use of biology for normative purposes. What is natural or
may occur in nature is good and thus allowed. In the context of ART, bionormativity
implies that legal parenthood must be a mirror image of the biological possibility of
parenthood. See ANNA SMAJDOR, NATURALNESS AND UNNATURALNESS IN
CONTEMPORARY BIOETHICS: PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND PAPER (2015).
6. See MARGARIA, supra note 4; Guillaume Kessler, The Parentage Disruption: A
Comparative Approach, 33 INT. J.L. POL’Y FAM. 316 (2019); Darren Langdridge & Eric
Blyth, Regulation of Assisted Conception Services in Europe: Implications of the New
Reproductive Technologies for “the Family”, 23 J. SOC. WELFARE FAM. L. 45 (2001);
Richard F. Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of Human Rights,
N.C. J. INT’L L. 38 (2018) [hereinafter Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European
Court of Human Rights]; Andrea Mulligan, Identity Rights and Sensitive Ethical
Questions: The European Convention on Human Rights and the Regulation of Surrogacy
Arrangements, 26 MED. L. REV. 449 (2018). This paper refers to non-traditional
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These norms depart from the liberal ideal of state neutrality. They
establish a hierarchy of desirable family forms and protect a legal ideology
of the family within the public realm. 7 Although framed as health
regulation, ART regulation’s underlying rationale stems from legal
concepts of the family rather than health. 8 This rationale considers
potential parents not only as patients with fertility issues. Since access to
ART grants access to family creation, the design of ART regulation
controls what is meant by the family. Restrictive regulation of access to
ART is equivalent to restrictions on non-traditional family creation.
These restrictive domestic legal frameworks force same-sex and
opposite-sex couples to travel beyond the borders of their jurisdiction to
access assisted reproductive services such as surrogacy in states that allow
them to do so. 9 Through this process, they create social realities of families
that do not necessarily fit into the traditional family law framework as
maintained in a domestic context. 10 Once back home, these families

7.
8.
9.

10.

families in cases of families involving non-marital and non-heterosexual relationships
and non-genetic parent-child links.
See Roxanne Mykitiuk, Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in the
Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 771 (2001).
Naomi Cahn, The Uncertain Legal Basis for the New Kinship, 36 J. FAM. ISSUES 501,
502 (2015) [hereinafter Cahn, Uncertain Legal Basis].
See Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, Surrogacy, System Shopping, and Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 33 INT. J.L. POL’Y FAM. 104 (2018); Richard F. Storrow,
The Proportionality Problem in Cross-border Reproductive Care, in THE GLOBALIZATION
OF HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 125 (I. Glenn Cohen ed., 2013)
[hereinafter Storrow, Proportionality Problem]; Richard F. Storrow, Quests for
Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 295 (2005) [hereinafter Storrow, Quests for Conception]. Popular destinations for
surrogacy are the United States, India, Russia, and the Ukraine.
MARGARIA, supra note 4; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 6; Mulligan, supra note 6; Alice Margaria, Parenthood and
Cross-Border Surrogacy: What Is ‘New’? The ECtHR’s First Advisory Opinion, 28 MED.
L. REV. 412 (2020) [hereinafter Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border Surrogacy]; Ní
Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 6; Lydia Bracken, Assessing the Best
Interests of the Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy: Inconsistency in the Strasbourg
Approach?, 39 J. SOC. WELFARE FAM. L. 368 (2017) [hereinafter Bracken, Assessing the
Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy]; Marianna Iliadou, Surrogacy
and the ECtHR: Reflections on Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, 27 MED. L. REV. 144
(2019); Paul Beaumont & Katarina Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights in the Area of Cross-border Surrogacy: Is There Still a Need for
Global Regulation of Surrogacy?, in MIGRANT CHILDREN IN THE XXI CENTURY.
SELECTED ISSUES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Giacomo Biagioni
& Francesca Ippolito eds., 2016) [hereinafter Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent
Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights]; Claire Fenton-Glynn, International
Surrogacy Before the European Court of Human Rights, 13 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 546 (2017)
[hereinafter Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy Before the European Court of
Human Rights].
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struggle to have birth certificates recognized, establish legal parenthood,
obtain citizenship, and claim social benefits associated with the parentchild relationship such as parental leave, child benefits, or orphan’s
pension. 11 The disjunction between social practice and domestic law
creates a situation of legal limbo. Confronted with legislative inaction,
these families seek to clarify their status through adjudication. 12 Thus, the
judiciary, both domestically and regionally through the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), gets involved in conceptualizing nontraditional families and debating their legal recognition.
ART’s power to shape kinship relations and concepts of relatedness
is a well-researched topic in the fields of sociology and anthropology. 13
The legal literature at the intersection of family law and health law related
to assisted reproduction has intensely debated family forms, legal
parenthood, and ART as a driving force of change. 14 This paper focuses
11. See MARGARIA, supra note 4; Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border Surrogacy, supra
note 10; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of Human Rights, supra
note 6; Richard F. Storrow, The Phantom Children of the Republic: International
Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561 (2011);
Mulligan, supra note 6; Kessler, supra note 6; Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the
Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy, supra note 10; Iliadou, supra note 10; Ní
Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European
Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy Before
the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
12. See generally, MARGARIA, supra note 4; Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border
Surrogacy, supra note 10; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 6; Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9; Mulligan,
supra note 6; Kessler, supra note 6; Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in
Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy, supra note 10; Iliadou, supra note 10; Ní Shúilleabháin,
supra note 9; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 10; Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy Before the
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., DOLGIN, supra note 2; SARAH FRANKLIN, EMBODIED PROGRESS: A CULTURAL
ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION (2002); Sarah Franklin & Susan McKinnon,
New Directions in Kinship Study: A Core Concept Revisited, 41 CURR. ANTHROPOL. 275
(2000); SARAH FRANKLIN & SUSAN MCKINNON, RELATIVE VALUES: RECONFIGURING
KINSHIP STUDIES (2002); REPRODUCING REPRODUCTION: KINSHIP, POWER, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, (Sarah Franklin & Helena Ragoné ed., 1998);
HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART (2019);
MARILYN STRATHERN, REPRODUCING THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON ANTHROPOLOGY,
KINSHIP AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1992); Cahn, Uncertain
Legal Basis, supra note 8; Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367 (2011)
[hereinafter Cahn, New Kinship]; Nancy E. Levine, Alternative Kinship, Marriage, and
Reproduction, 37 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 375 (2008); Jeanette Edwards et al.,
TECHNOLOGIES OF PROCREATION: KINSHIP IN THE AGE OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
(2005).
14. See, e.g., Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT. J.L. POL’Y FAM.
242 (2007); DOLGIN, supra note 2; Daniel Gruenbaum, Foreign Surrogate Motherhood:
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on the judiciary and the role of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) more specifically. 15 It offers an analysis and critique of the
ECtHR’s reaction to the social change happening with the increased use
of ART and its impact in a cross-border and domestic context. Judicial
Mater Semper Certa Erat, 60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 475 (2012); Cahn, Uncertain Legal
Basis, supra note 8; Cahn, New Kinship, supra note 13; Yehezkel Margalit, Orrie Levy
& John Loike, The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating
Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107 (2014) [hereinafter Margalit
et al., The New Frontier]]; Mykitiuk, supra note 7; Cherylon Robinson & Michael V.
Miller, Emergent Legal Definitions of Parentage in Assisted Reproductive Technology, 8 J.
FAM. SOC. WORK 21 (2004); Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What’s New
and What’s Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691 (1999); Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the
Game: Parentage Determinations When Assisted Reproductive Technology Is Used to Create
Families, 62 ARK. L. REV. 29 (2009); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of
Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 125 (2006); Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 2;
Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Arts, Mistakes, Sex,
Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER L. 1 (2003); Katharine K. Baker, The DNA
Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037
(2016); Kessler, supra note 6; NeJaime, Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2; Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 119 (2018). There is also
significant legal literature offering a normative analysis of reproductive rights and nontraditional family creation through access to ART. This literature usually focuses on
reproductive rights, reproductive justice, autonomy, and equality. See, e.g., Kimberly
M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22 (2015);
Macarena Saez, Transforming Family Law Through Same-Sex Marriage: Lessons From
(And To) Western World, 25 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 125 (2014); Lynn D.
Wardle, Reflections on Equality in Family Law, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1385 (2013); Martha
Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 925 (1991); Max D. Siegel,
The Future of Family, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 177 (2012); Catherine E. Smith,
Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars
of Exclusion-Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, and Biology, 28 L. INEQ. 307 (2010).
15. A few scholars have focused specifically on the role of the judiciary. See, e.g., Linda S.
Maule & Karen Schmid, Assisted Reproduction and the Courts: The Case of California,
27 J. FAM. ISSUES 464 (2006); Mellisa Holtzman, Nonmarital Unions, Family
Definitions, and Custody Decision Making, 60 FAM. RELAT. 617 (2011); Timothy
Caulfield, Canadian Family Law and the Genetic Revolution: A Survey of Cases Involving
Paternity Testing, 26 QUEEN’S L.J. 67 (2000); Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent
Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Mulligan, supra note
6; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy Before the
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 6; Katarina Trimmings, Surrogacy
Arrangements and the Best Interests of the Child: The Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN
TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES 187 (Elisabetta Bergamini & Chiara Ragni eds., 2019);
Andrea Büchler, The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life: The Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights on Parenthood and Family Form, in FAMILY FORMS
AND PARENTHOOD: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ARTICLE 8 ECHR 29 (Andrea Büchler
and Helen Keller eds., 2016).
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discourse has the power to shape the structure of moral and political
debate. 16 It serves as an impetus for the legislature who is eventually
responsible for democratically legitimized law reform and establishes the
human rights framework in which such law reform can materialize.
Despite the globalization of reproductive technology and the rise of
cross-border fertility services, the legal concepts of parenthood, family,
and family life remain a domestic affair,17 as reflected in the variety of
legislation throughout Europe. 18 Nevertheless, the ECtHR has recently
taken a more active stance, bringing about a Europeanization of these
legal concepts. 19 The ECtHR case law in this context provides empirical
evidence as to the evolution of legal standards and judicial reasoning.
A critical aspect of recognizing non-traditional family creation and
family life is the legal recognition of parent-child relationships. This paper
traces the ECtHR’s role in defining legal parenthood—the legal
determination of who is a parent—for children born through crossborder surrogacy in the early 21st century. 20 In a series of cases, the Court
has made clear that the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 21 imposes domestic recognition of a legal parent-child
relationship for children born through cross-border surrogacy to some

16. See generally Susanne Baer, Who Cares? A Defence of Judicial Review, 8 J. BRITISH ACAD.
75 (2020).
17. See Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9; HACKER, supra note 2 at 37
(describing a ‘bordered globalization’ to highlight the globalization of ART and the
domestic character of legal concepts such as parenthood, family, and family life).
18. See NEZA KOGOVSEK SALAMON, WHITE PAPER: RIGHTS ON THE MOVE, RAINBOW
FAMILIES IN EUROPE (2015); Francesco Paolo Busardò, Matteo Gulino, Simona
Napoletano, Simona Zaami & Paola Frati, The Evolution of Legislation in the Field of
Medically Assisted Reproduction and Embryo Stem Cell Research in European Union
Members, 2014 BIOMED RSCH. INT’L 1 (2014) [hereinafter Busardò et al.]; ILGAEurope Rainbow Map 2020, ILGA-EUROPE, [https://perma.cc/C876-Q8XV]
[hereinafter ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map].
19. See MARGARIA, supra note 4; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 6; Mulligan, supra note 6; Margaria, Parenthood and CrossBorder Surrogacy, supra note 10; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 6;
Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy, supra
note 10; Iliadou, supra note 10; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy
Before the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10. See also, more generally,
Sabrina Ragone & Valentina Volpe, An Emerging Right to a “Gay” Family Life? The
Case Oliari v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective, 17 GERMAN L. J. 451 (2016).
20. Daphna Hacker uses the term cross-border surrogacy, as opposed to international
surrogacy. See HACKER, supra note 2 at 133.
21. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
better known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was opened for signature
in Rome on November 4, 1950, and came into force in 1953.
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extent. 22 The Court thus forced all Member States of the Council of
Europe, even those prohibiting domestic surrogacy, to make their legal
framework uniform in this matter. 23 However, the ECtHR’s reasoning in
these cases is noteworthy in several regards.
First, the ECtHR’s recognition of legal parenthood in nontraditional families falling outside of a domestic family law framework
relies neither on reproductive rights nor the intended parents’ right to
family life, nor on the principle of non-discrimination between oppositesex and same-sex couples.24 In a novel move, the Court frames the
recognition of the legal parent-child link as an essential element of the
child’s identity. 25 Non-recognition of this link is contrary to the child’s
best interests and constitutes a violation of the child’s right to respect for
private life protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.26
Second, the ECtHR links genetics, identity, and best interests when
recognizing legal parenthood in non-traditional families. In Mennesson v.
France 27, Labassee v. France 28, and subsequent cases, 29 the ECtHR
advances that legal recognition of the parent-child link is an essential
22. See Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee v. France, App. No.
65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145378; Foulon v.
France, App. No. 9063/14 et 10410/14 (July 21, 2016), [https://perma.cc/AEU9SA69]; Laborie v. France, App. No. 44024/13 (January 19, 2017),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170661; Paradiso v. Italy, App. No. 25358/12
(January 24, 2017), [https://perma.cc/XJ8G-Z7YE]; C v. France, App. No. 1462/18
and 17348/18 (November 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/HYF6-GLMC]; D v. France,
App. No. 11288/18 (July 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/H74R-QEDE]; Valdís
Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App. No. 71552/17 (May 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/45J6KE9H].
23. See Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee, App. No. 65941/11; Foulon,
App. No. 9063/14 and 10410/14; Laborie, App. No. 44024/13; Paradiso, App. No.
25358/12; C and E v. France, App. No. 1462/18 and 17348/18; D v. France, App.
No. 11288/18; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
24. This paper refers to non-traditional families as families involving non-marital and nonheterosexual relationships and non-genetic parent-child links.
25. See Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee, App. No. 65941/11; Foulon,
App. No. 9063/14 and 10410/14; Laborie, App. No. 44024/13; Paradiso, App. No.
25358/12; C and E v. France, App. No. 1462/18 and 17348/18; D v. France, App.
No. 11288/18; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
26. See Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee, App. No. 65941/11; Foulon,
App. No. 9063/14 and 10410/14; Laborie, App. No. 44024/13; Paradiso, App. No.
25358/12; C v. France, App. No. 1462/18 and 17348/18; D v. France, App. No.
11288/18; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
27. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, ¶ 100.
28. Labassee, App. No. 65941/11, ¶ 59.
29. See Foulon, App. No. 9063/14 and 10410/14; Laborie, App. No. 44024/13; Paradiso,
App. No. 25358/12; C v. France, App. No. 1462/18 and 17348/18; D v. France,
App. No. 11288/18; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
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element of the child’s identity and best interests, but only concerning the
genetic parent. The language that emerges emphasizes the importance of
the genetic link when determining legal parenthood. The Court’s
reasoning embodies the assumption that social (i.e., non-genetically
related) parenthood resulting from the use of donor gametes and a
surrogate mother does not rise to the level of an important facet of the
child’s identity.
The consequences of the ECtHR’s stance are revealing in a domestic
context. Following the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, domestic supreme courts
have refused to recognize legal parenthood in cases where neither of the
intended parents have a genetic link with the child, thus allowing
domestic authorities to register the child as being born to unknown
parents and eventually give them up for adoption. 30 The ECtHR accepted
this result in its decisions Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy 31 and Valdís
Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland. 32
Third, in the recent case D v. France, 33 the ECtHR introduced a
gender-discriminatory twist to its genetic view of legal parenthood. While
pushing for giving full effect to the foreign birth certificate for the
intended genetic father, the Court accepted that intended genetic
mothers must go through the additional step of domestic adoption to
establish a legal parent-child relationship.
This paper offers a critical reading of these recent jurisprudential
developments pushed by the ECtHR. Their significance transpires
beyond the individual outcomes in the cases concerned. Through the
empirical evidence of the ECtHR case law, this paper documents the
power of the genetic link in judicial recognition of legal parenthood in
non-traditional families, pushed by an increasing reliance on genetic
evidence and biological relatedness. The paper critically discusses the
formal legitimization of biology’s importance in the formulation of
parental rights and obligations through judicial statements about the
value of biological relationships in legal parenthood. In contrast to the
30. See, e.g., two precedents of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court which follow the ECtHR’s
case law: Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 21, 2015, 141
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 312
[https://perma.cc/WJS7-GFC3] [hereinafter Swiss Same-sex Case]; Bundesgericht
[BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 14, 2015 141 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 328 [https://perma.cc/KT5QNMPV] [hereinafter Swiss Opposite-sex Case]. For more examples of domestic case
law in the aftermath of the relevant ECtHR precedents, see Beaumont & Trimmings,
Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
31. Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12.
32. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
33. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18.
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purpose of ART—to surmount biological barriers—genetic essentialism,
as relied on by the Court, encourages a biologically determined view of
parenthood which sidelines the intended social parent and ignores the
circumstances of non-traditional family creation. The paper addresses the
disregard in the Court’s precedents as to the situation of the intended
social parents. These individuals usually play an equal role in the creation
of non-traditional families but, due to the absence of a genetic link to the
child, face obstacles and exclusions, if not discriminations, in obtaining
recognition of parental status.
Furthermore, this paper attempts to situate the focus on biology as
a natural blueprint of the social reality (of parenting) in the broader
context of a reorientation towards genetics due to the technological
advances in genetic medicine. This development has occurred in a line of
ECtHR case law recognizing a new individual human right to know one’s
origins. 34 The Court has gradually recognized knowledge about one’s
genetic inheritance as something substantial to the human being and its
well-being. 35 The recognition of this new human right is closely
connected to the technological possibility of determining genetic
relatedness with precision and the still unfolding scientific link of genetics
to health and disease.
The paper argues that in the context of ART, technological progress
impacts legal reasoning and recognition of new rights. The ECtHR’s
34. See, e.g., Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, App. No. 238/90 (December 20, 2007),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84106; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 143; Çolak v. Turkey, App. No. 60176/00 (May 30, 2006)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-75510; Jäggi v. Switzerland, 2006-X Eur. Ct.
H.R. 21, Kalacheva v. Russia, App. No. 3451/05 (May 7, 2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92572; Grönmark v. Finland, App. No. 17038
/04 (July 6, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105630; Backlund v.
Finland, App. No. 36498/05 (July 6, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00199784; Pascaud v. France, App. No. 19535/08 (June 16, 2011),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105158; A. M. M. v. Romania, App. No. 2151
/10 (February 14, 2012), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-38445924417275; Godelli v. Italy, App. No.
33783/09 (September 25, 2012),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-113460; Laakso v. Finland, App. No. 7361/05
(January 15, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115861; Röman v. Finland,
App. No. 13072/05 (January 29, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001115864; Gaskin v. UK, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (1989); Odièvre
v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.53.
35. See, e.g., Phinikaridou, App. No. 238/90; Mikulić, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 143; Çolak,
App. No. 60176/00; Jäggi, 2006-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, Kalacheva, App. No. 3451/05;
Grönmark, App. No. 17038/04; Backlund, App. No. 36498/05; Pascaud, App. No.
19535/08; A. M. M., App. No. 2151/10; Godelli, App. No. 33783/09; Laakso, App.
No. 7361/05; Ro

2022]

GENETIC ESSENTIALISM AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION

131

reasoning and its focus on genetic relatedness might be explained by the
search for clarity in the context of fluid, non-traditional family forms.
The technologies of genetic testing provide certainty. A dichotomy thus
becomes apparent between ART which allow for the creation of a more
plural and diversified social reality including non-traditional families, and
genetic technologies which serve as a tool nudging towards a narrower
legal definition of the parent-child relationship based on verifiable genetic
relatedness. Eventually, these issues decided by the Court go beyond
biological truth and its normative implications. They also speak to the
political relationship between citizens and the polity and how polity
membership is defined in a European context.
Finally, this paper addresses the gender discriminatory twist
introduced by the ECtHR to its genetic view of legal parenthood in the
context of cross-border surrogacy and speculates about the future
trajectory of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The Court accepts that
intended genetic mothers must go through the additional procedural step
of domestic adoption for their genetically related child. In contrast,
intended genetic fathers benefit from direct legal recognition of the
foreign birth certificate. 36 Thus, the Court seems to endorse an additional
element of power and control over legal motherhood imposed by
evaluating a genetic mother’s fitness to be a legal mother, which violates
the ECHR’s prohibition of discrimination.
Part II of this paper briefly summarizes how the development and
progress of ART have brought about significant social change by
diversifying family creation and family life. Part III describes how current
European domestic legal frameworks regulating ART still impose many
restrictions on non-traditional family creation, forcing opposite-sex and
same-sex couples to travel abroad to access services such as gamete
donation and surrogacy. Cross-border surrogacy creates a situation of
legal limbo in a domestic context, as the legal parent-child relationship
and the critical consequences attached to this relationship are not
recognized once these families return home. Through the empirical
evidence of the ECtHR’s case law, Part IV uncovers how the Court has
taken an active stance in forcing European states to address the legal limbo
and recognize legal parenthood for children born through cross-border
surrogacy, with an exclusive focus on genetics, identity, and best interests.
Part V depicts the latest twist in the ECtHR’s case law on cross-border
surrogacy, refusing parity of reasoning for recognizing legal motherhood
and fatherhood. Part VI offers a critical analysis of the Court’s reasoning
and its positions; in particular, its genetic essentialism and the gender36. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 43, 62, 85, and 86.
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discriminatory aspects of recognizing legal parenthood in cross-border
surrogacy cases. Part VII concludes, reflecting on how scientific progress
allows for the creation of more diversified family forms, while the ECtHR
limits its reasoning to the biological truth of genetics, thus disregarding
both the child’s and the intended social parent’s interests and rights.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Our growing knowledge of reproduction and genetics has facilitated
the development and success of ART. 37 These technologies diversify how
parenthood may be achieved, including through egg, sperm, and embryo
donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and
traditional and gestational surrogacy. 38 The impact of ART, however,
goes beyond science and medicine.
ART usage has broadened to not only treat medical conditions but
also to address social realities, such as in the case of same-sex couples
whose desire to become parents is hindered by a biological obstacle.39 As
such, ART have allowed for questioning and disrupting the biological
underpinnings of traditional conceptions of family and parenthood,
pushing away from the heteronormative and bionormative standards of a
married male-female couple and their biologically related children. 40 In
other words, ART explode the myth that parenthood and family are
purely biological. 41 The technology is not at the origin of changing
conceptions of the family, but has pushed the unfolding of this ongoing
development of social change. Since ART make it possible to split up

37. See Ruth Deech, Family Law and Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1998).
38. Egg and sperm donations implicate the genetic material of one individual, while an
embryo contains the genetic material of two individuals. In gestational surrogacy, the
surrogate mother is not genetically related to the embryo she is carrying. In traditional
surrogacy, she is genetically related to the embryo.
39. Maule & Schmid, supra note 15, at 479.
40. See DOLGIN, supra note 2. As Dolgin notes, “society faces dramatic shifts in the
contours and significance of what has, for centuries, been among its central institutions
— the family.” Id. at ix. Dolgin situates the contribution of ART to these shifts as
follows: “[A]lthough reproductive technology has revolutionized traditional
understandings of the family, the advent of reproductive technology did not initiate
the process of change. The new technological options for human reproduction did not
come widely available until after the family (and family law) had accepted a wide set of
changes, including no-fault divorce, nonmarital cohabitation, and prenuptial
agreements in contemplation of divorce, that challenge traditional understandings of
proper family relationships.” Id. at 4.
41. See Mykitiuk, supra note 7.
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genetic, gestational, and social parenthood, they fragment the concept of
family and promise diversified family creation and family life. 42
III. SOCIAL REALITY AND LEGAL LIMBO
In the European context, restrictive family laws and health laws
regulating access to ART pose significant obstacles to realizing this
technological promise of social change in favor of non-traditional
families. Existing regulatory frameworks not only affect potential parents
as patients with fertility issues but also reflect an attempt to control what
is meant by the family. Both family laws and ART regulations depart from
the liberal ideal of state neutrality and express a hierarchy of desirable—
traditional—family forms, thus pursuing a legal ideology of the family. 43
This context is crucial to understand the phenomenon of cross-border
surrogacy and the legal limbo the parents and their children find
themselves in.
Two major variables define access to ART: the type of services
permitted or prohibited and the individuals allowed access to the services
provided. 44 Family law and ART regulation based on a traditional notion
of the family circumscribe these two variables and impose restrictions on
non-traditional family creation for same-sex couples, opposite-sex
couples, and individuals. 45 The term traditional refers to two oppositesex parents, a mother and a father, with children to whom they are
42. See Mykitiuk, supra note 7; Garrison, The Technological Family, supra note 14;
Anderson, supra note 14; Meyer, supra note 14; Garrison, Law Making for Baby
Making, supra note 2; Kessler, supra note 6; Robinson & Miller, supra note 14;
DOLGIN, supra note 2; S. Golombok, C. Murray, V. Jadva, E. Lycett, F. MacCallum
& J. Rust, Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent–Child
Relationships and the Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3,
21 HUM. REPROD. 1918 (2006); Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the
Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1995). Langdridge and Blyth
define “traditional” as two opposite-sex parents with children to whom they are
biologically related and conceived without medical or third party assistance.
Langdridge & Blyth, supra note 6, at 55. Some authors argue that ART push towards
an area of family creation and family life based on intent, choice, and contract. See,
e.g., YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE: BETWEEN FAMILY LAW
AND CONTRACT LAW (2019) [hereinafter MARGALIT, DETERMINING LEGAL
PARENTAGE]; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002) [hereinafter
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention]; Gillian Douglas, The Intention to be a Parent
and the Making of Mothers, 57 MOD. L. REV. 636 (1994).
43. See Mykitiuk, supra note 7.
44. Langdridge & Blyth, supra note 6, at 48.
45. See MARGARIA, supra note 4.
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biologically related (“nuclear ideal”). 46 This notion of the family is the
archetype that retains considerable influence in framing European
domestic laws. However, it is becoming increasingly distant from the
lived reality of many European families and their children. 47
One of the driving forces of restrictive family laws and health laws
regulating access to ART are bionormative naturalness arguments.
Nature, naturalness, or bionormativity—according to which only
parenthood links which may occur in nature are good and thus allowed—
is still very present in Europe. 48 Through relying on the concept of nature
46. Langdridge & Blyth, supra note 6, at 55.
47. See Salamon, supra note 18; INGEBORG SCHWENZER, TENSIONS BETWEEN LEGAL,
BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CONCEPTIONS OF PARENTAGE (2007); Trimmings &
Beaumont, supra note 4; Roseneil et al., supra note 4; Carmen Garcimartin, Defining
Familial Relations Within the Law: Nuclear Family vs. Extended Family, 3 INT’L J.
JURISPRUDENCE FAM. 85 (2012). The same is true for the United States. See, e.g., Cahn,
New Kinship, supra note 13; William N. Eskridge Jr, Family Law Pluralism: The
Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881
(2011); Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship
and the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43 (2012);
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185
(2016) [hereinafter Nejaime, Marriage Equality]; Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy
and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015); Martha
Minow, All in the Family & in all Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA.
L. REV. 275 (1993); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:
Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007);
Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization
of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2012);
Robinson & Miller, supra note 14; Clare Huntington, Family Law and Nonmarital
Families, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 233 (2015). For the Canadian context, see Campbell, supra
note 14; Mykitiuk, supra note 7.
48. See Kessler, supra note 6. For a historical perspective on bionormativity, see Katharine
K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649
(2008). The Swiss government, in its 1996 report accompanying the draft of the
Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction, provides an enlightening example of
bionormativity: “Nature wants every child to have a father and a mother. These
individuals have special importance for the development of the child. . . . These
fundamental principles of human nature must be respected in the implementation of
ART. Thus these techniques should be considered only for heterosexual couples, a
woman and a man, who intend to assume all parental responsibility together.” 26 BBL
III 205, 250 (1996) (Switz.). Moreover: “The fact that medically assisted reproduction
should not give rise to family relations which differ from those which nature makes
possible is decisive.” Id. at 254. The Swiss government continued to adhere to these
bionormative tendencies in 2013, in its report on the revision of the constitutional
article on reproductive medicine: “The right of a child resulting from IVF treatment
to have a father and a mother, and to grow up in a family as children conceived
naturally, must also be guaranteed.” Federal Council, Botschaft zur Änderung der
Verfassungsbestimmung zur Fortpflanzungsmedizin und Gentechnologie im
Humanbereich (Art. 119 BV) sowie des Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes
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and using biology for normative purposes, many European regulations
still bar access to ART for same-sex couples, arguing that in their case,
there is no medical indication for treatment (social as opposed to medical
infertility). 49 It is true that in both areas, family law and access to ART,
regulations in European states have been liberalized over the years by
national legislatures, gradually expanding rights for same-sex couples and
non-traditional families. 50 However, the liberalization and diversification
witnessed are mainly limited to adult relationships and family life. 51 It has
not yet broadly reached the legal parent-child relationship. 52 As Margaria
notes that “despite the trend of providing some form of legal recognition
to same-sex relationships mainly through civil partnership, the institution
of marriage and, most importantly, the rights and benefits associated to
it—for instance, adoption rights or access to ARTs—remain mostly
reserved for heterosexual couples.” 53 The link between marital status,
sexual orientation, and access to ART remains strong under the current
restrictive regulations. 54
Certain ART, such as egg donation, are barred for opposite-sex
couples as well, based on the normative argument that genetic and
gestational motherhood should not be split. 55 Commercial surrogacy is

49.
50.
51.

52.

53.
54.

55.

(Präimplantationsdiagnostik) vom 7 BBL 5853, 5953 (2013) (Switz.). For a critic, see
Melanie Levy, Beyond Bionormativity - Revision of Article 119 of the Swiss Constitution,
in RÉVISION IMAGINAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE: MÉLANGES EN HOMMAGE
AU PROF. LUZIUS MADER 193 (Sophie Weerts et al. eds., 2018).
Langdridge & Blyth, supra note 6; MARGARIA, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 6; Roseneil et al., supra note 4; MARGARIA, supra note 4.
Kessler, supra note 6; Roseneil et al., supra note 4; MARGARIA, supra note 4; Langdridge
& Blyth, supra note 6, at 55. (“One of the major remaining institutionalized prejudices
for lesbians and gay men concerns their right to have and/or care for children as
evidenced by the regulation of assisted conception services throughout Europe.”).
The rights of same-sex couples to adopt children and access ART are limited in most
European states. Out of the forty-nine European countries indexed in the ILGAEurope Rainbow Map 2020, only seventeen allow for joint adoption, nineteen allow
for second-parent adoption, fourteen allow for access to ART, and ten allow for
automatic co-parent recognition. See Salamon, supra note 18; Busardò et al., supra note
18. ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map, supra note 18.
MARGARIA, supra note 4, at 128.
MARGARIA, supra note 4; Salamon, supra note 18; Busardò et al., supra note 18. ILGAEurope Rainbow Map, supra note 18. In Europe, the symbolic power of the marriage
sacrament, which sought to perpetuate the opposite-sex couple relationship for
reproduction, still figures prominently. There still is a (normative) link between
marriage or marital status and access to parenthood through adoption and ART in
many European states. See Salamon, supra note 18; Busardò et al., supra note 18.
See S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 297.
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prohibited in most of Europe, except Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 56
Non-commercial surrogacy is legal in the UK, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Portugal, and the Czech Republic. In Greece, Belgium, Spain,
and Finland, surrogacy is not regulated by law, but it is not prohibited
either. Beyond bionormativity, restrictions on surrogacy are maintained
based on additional arguments, such as the protection of vulnerable
women against exploitation, commercialization of the female body and
pregnancy, protection against trafficking, and the child’s best interests. 57
Access to ART grants access to family creation and family life.
Restrictive European domestic legal frameworks on access to ART are
equivalent to restrictions on non-traditional family creation. They force
same-sex couples, opposite-sex couples, and individuals, to travel abroad
to obtain assisted reproduction services such as sperm, ova, and embryo
donation, and surrogacy services. A normative analysis of cross-border
reproductive services and their consequences on the individuals involved,
in particular the surrogate mothers, goes beyond the scope of this paper. 58
However, from the intended parent perspective, it is critical to note that
the cross-border element is a forced element, as no alternative is available
to them domestically. 59 Having to travel abroad, these couples or
individuals create social realities of families that do not fit into the
traditional family law framework as maintained in their domestic
contexts.
The social reality of using cross-border fertility services has bypassed
the state of domestic law, revealing a conflict between the law’s certainty
and the fluidity and openness of non-traditional family forms. The
disjuncture between social practice and domestic legal regimes creates a
situation of legal limbo for these children and their families. What does
this legal limbo look like if the social reality of non-traditional families
created abroad is not transformed into a legal reality in the domestic
context? Once back home, these families struggle to have birth certificates

56. Valeria Piersanti, Francesca Consalvo, Fabrizio Signore, Alessandro Del Rio & Simona
Zaami, Surrogacy and “Procreative Tourism,” What Does the Future Hold from the Ethical
and Legal Perspectives?, 57 MEDICINA 47 (2021).
57. DOLGIN, supra note 2; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent
Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Gruenbaum, supra
note 14.
58. DOLGIN, supra note 2; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent
Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Gruenbaum, supra
note 14.
59. Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9;
Storrow, Quests for Conception, supra note 9.
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officially recognized because surrogacy is prohibited by domestic law. 60
Inscribing a child’s birth into a state database for civil status records and
establishing a legal parent-child relationship—the civil status of a family
member as a legal parent—is a precondition for claiming other rights and
benefits. Having two legal parents entitles the child to both parents’
employer or government-sponsored health and disability insurance,
education, housing, and nutrition assistance; and social security
benefits. 61 Recognition of legal parenthood is also essential for inheritance
and in cases of separation, divorce, or death of the parents. Furthermore,
the legal limbo also impacts the political relationship between citizen and
polity, as recognizing legal parenthood is a precondition for establishing
the child’s citizenship. 62 All of these legal challenges occur regardless of
whether the couple is same-sex or opposite-sex.
ART have led to widespread impact, even though only a small
percentage of children are born through cross-border surrogacy. 63
Furthermore, the number of children born in such circumstances is

60. Birth certificates for children born through cross-border fertility services include both
cases of children born through ART when the partner of the child’s biological parent
is granted parental rights based on a second-parent adoption and is subsequently
inscribed onto the birth certificate, and cases when the second non-biological parent
obtains parental rights and is inscribed onto the birth certificate immediately at the
child’s birth. This also includes cases of surrogacy in which two opposite-sex or samesex partners are registered as intended and legal parents on the birth certificate,
independently of their respective genetic link to the child.
61. MARGARIA, supra note 4; Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border Surrogacy, supra note
10; Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of Human Rights, supra note
6; Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9; Mulligan, supra note 6; Kessler, supra
note 6; Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy,
supra note 10; Iliadou, supra note 10; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Beaumont &
Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10;
Holtzman, supra note 15.
62. Caitlin Pryce, Surrogacy and Citizenship: A Conjunctive Solution to a Global Problem,
23 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 925 (2016); Charles P. Kindregan & Danielle White,
International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in Cross-Border
Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L. L. R. 527 (2013);
Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 6,
at 63. As Storrow notes, “citizenship is transmitted to the newly born via consanguinity
with a citizen parent—jus sanguinis. The blood tie assumes central importance as the
ultimate symbol of citizenship. Birth certificates in this system provide evidence of
consanguinity and are recorded not only to define lines of descent but to transmit
citizenship. The evidence of consanguinity they contain is sufficient for the child to
achieve the status of a citizen. But if the mother named in the birth certificate is not
the natural mother, then anxiety about whether citizenship has been properly or ought
to be transmitted results. It is a question, it turns out, about the public order.” Id.
63. Maule & Schmid, supra note 15.
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rising. 64 While official numbers are lacking, a report of the European
Parliament of 2013 clearly shows an increase in the number of individuals
and couples who create their families through surrogacy. 65
IV. LEGAL PARENTHOOD IN CROSS-BORDER SURROGACY FAMILIES:
THE ECTHR’S FOCUS ON GENETICS
In many European states, political decision-making processes have
been slow to adjust the law to new social realities in the context of family
and ART. 66 Confronted with legislative inaction, some families seek
judicial adjudication to clarify their status, forcing the courts to deal with
the gap between family law and the social realities of non-traditional
families. 67 Therefore, the judiciary gets involved in conceptualizing nontraditional families and debating their legal recognition.
This paper documents empirical evidence from a bundle of recent
cases on the legal parenthood ramifications of cross-border surrogacy
adjudicated by the ECtHR in the early 21st century. It analyzes how the
ECtHR considers the social reality of non-traditional families and paves
the way for the legal recognition of more diverse family forms.
Disentangling judicial reasoning and rationales through the empirical
evidence of the ECtHR’s case law allows for a critical analysis of the
shifting normativities in the definition of legal parenthood in the
European context. As Storrow notes,

64. Kessler, supra note 6; Justo Aznar & Miriam Martínez Peris, Gestational Surrogacy:
Current View, 86 LINACRE Q. 56 (2019).
65. Laurence Brunet, Janeen Carruthers, Konstantina Davaki, Derek King, Claire Marzo
& Julie McCandless, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C:
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, A Comparative Study on the Regime of
Surrogacy in EU Member States, PE 474.403 (2013).
66. MARGARIA, supra note 4; Salamon, supra note 18; Busardò et al., supra note 18.
67. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee v. France, App. No.
65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145378; Foulon and
Bouvet v. France, App. No.
9063/14 et 10410/14 (July 21, 2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165462; Laborie v. France, App. No. 44024/13
(January 19, 2017), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170661; Paradiso v. Italy,
App. No. 25358/12 (January 24, 2017) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001170359; C v. France, App. No. 1462/18 and 17348/18 (November 19, 2019);
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-6589814-8731890; D v. France, App. No.
11288/18 (July 16, 2020), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203938; Valdís
Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App. No.
71552/17 (May 18, 2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209992.
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[C]ourts play an essential function in holding the more
extreme manifestations of majoritarian control in check,
thereby safeguarding the rights of minorities. An effective
judiciary is necessary to ensure that democracy will function
well enough to respect minority rights. This is the role that the
members of the Council of Europe have agreed the [ECtHR]
should fulfill. 68
The ECtHR’s approach to judicial intervention depends on the
issues at stake. 69 If there is a lack of consensus within the Member States
of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of an
interest or as to the best means of protecting it, in particular where the
case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues (e.g., abortion, ART, adoption,
assisted suicide, euthanasia), the Court grants a wide margin of
appreciation at the domestic level. However, when a particularly
important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake (e.g.,
knowledge about one’s origins, physical and moral security, and
possibility of personal development of transsexuals), the Court usually
narrows the Member States’ margin. 70 This distinction has a significant
impact on how the ECtHR developed its case law regarding legal
parenthood ramifications of cross-border surrogacy.
A. Taxonomy of ECtHR Case Law
A brief taxonomy of the ECtHR’s case law in the context of ART
provides an overview of the Court’s stance in these matters. 71 First of all,
there is case law on individuals’ reproductive rights in the context of
traditional family creation through ART, that is, opposite-sex couples in
need of ART such as IVF to become parents using their own eggs and
sperm.72 Another area of jurisprudence concerns non-traditional family
68. Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9 at 146. See also Baer, supra note 16
(noting the importance of the ECtHR for the protection of minority rights in Europe).
69. Janneke Gerards, Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 495 (2018).
70. For a detailed discussion of the ECtHR’s doctrine on the margin of appreciation and
relevant case law, see European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights—Right to Respect for Private and Family Life,
Home and Correspondence, Case-Law Guide (2021), [https://perma.cc/8SKD-4RVV].
71. See also Büchler, supra note 15; Mulligan, supra note 6; Storrow, International Surrogacy
in the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 6.
72. For cases concerning reproductive rights but unrelated to non-traditional family
formation, see Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No, 6339/05 (April, 10 2007),
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creation through ART. These cases are brought forward by same-sex and
opposite-sex couples and individuals in need of ART such as IVF, egg,
sperm, or embryo donation, and/or surrogacy to realize their desire to
become parents.
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the area of non-traditional family
creation can be divided into two categories. The first category includes
cases in which individuals demand a general change of principles,
contesting restrictive domestic ART regulation and claiming access to
ART prohibited by domestic law (e.g., access to egg donation for
opposite-sex couples, sperm donation for same-sex couples). In this area,
the Court has usually refrained from intervening, granting Member States
a wide margin of appreciation to regulate domestic access to ART. 73 By
doing so, the Court expresses respect for democracy, subsidiarity, and
sovereignty of the Member States. At the same time, the Court underlines
the importance of keeping fast-moving scientific and legal developments
in the field of ART under review, leaving the door open for the evolution
of its jurisprudence in the matter. 74 The Court recognizes that the

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80046; Dickson v. United Kingdom, App.
No.44362/04 (December 4, 2007), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83788;
Costa and Pavan v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10 (August, 28 2012),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112993; Knecht v. Romania, App. No. 10048
/10 (October 2, 2012).
73. The Court has so far refrained from using human rights to challenge the limits on nontraditional family creation set by traditional family law and restrictive ART regulation,
based on the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), or equal treatment
and non-discrimination (Article 14). The most common legal restrictions on ART tend
to burden the creation of social parenthood relationships or single-parent families. In
this context of non-traditional family creation, or, as the ECtHR describes it, “unusual
family relations . . . which do not follow the typical parent-child relationship based on
a direct biological link,” the Court has granted a wide margin of appreciation to
Member States to regulate ART and place restrictions on access to these technologies
in a domestic context. See S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 297. For domestic
regulation restricting access to adoption for same-sex couples and single individuals,
the situation is different. Here the ECtHR has intervened, recognizing a violation of
the parent’s rights, i.e., Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with
Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life). See Wagner and J.M.W.L.
v. Luxembourg, App. No.76240/01 (June 28, 2007) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-81328; E.B. v. France, App. No. 43546/02 (January 22, 2008)
[https://perma.cc/7PF7-XX2J]; X v. Austria, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. However, the
Court has not recognized discrimination in cases of difference of treatment based on
marriage, i.e., limiting common or stepparent adoption to married couples is not a
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. See Gas and Dubois v.
France, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 245.
74. S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 297.

2022]

GENETIC ESSENTIALISM AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION

141

Convention’s interpretation should be made in light of present-day
conditions, and thus is a living instrument. 75
The second category concerns cases of cross-border reproductive
services in which individuals are pushed to leave their jurisdiction due to
restrictive domestic ART regulation and then depend on status
normalization and the creation of a legal reality for children born abroad
through ART and surrogacy. In this strand of case law, the Court has
been confronted with existing non-traditional families, children born into
these families through cross-border reproductive services and surrogacy,
and non-recognition of the children in the parent’s country of origin.
These cases thus raise the issue of recognition of legal parenthood, that is,
the legal parent-child relationship. Here the Court has engaged in a more
proactive approach, refusing to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the
Member States. It has established European legal standards for
recognizing legal parent-child relationships that authorities must adhere
to, irrespective of the domestic legal framework that might prohibit
specific ART or surrogacy. 76
The paper only briefly alludes here to the first category and focuses
on the second category henceforth. It does not address the broader issue
concerning the boundaries of the legal concept of family life and the
protection of family life in Article 8 ECHR. 77 This issue was addressed,
for example, in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy. 78 In this case, the Grand
Chamber denied the existence and protection of de facto family life
between the intended parents and their genetically unrelated child born
through cross-border surrogacy. 79 In Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v.
75. S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 297.
76. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee v. France, App. No.
65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145378; Foulon v.
France, App. No. 9063/14 et 10410/14 (July 21, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-165462; Laborie v. France, App. No. 44024/13 (January 19, 2017),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170661; Paradiso v. Italy, App. No. 25358/12
(January 24, 2017) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170359; C v. France, App.
No. 1462/18 and 17348/18 (November 19, 2019), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=003-6589814-8731890; D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 (July 16, 2020),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203938; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App.
No. 71552/17 (May 18, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209992.
77. Büchler, supra note 15; Linda Hart, Anthropology of Kinship Meets Human Rights
Rationality: Limits of Marriage and Family Life in the European Court of Human Rights,
20 EUR. SOCIETIES 816 (2018).
78. Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12.
79. Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12. For a detailed case discussion, see Ní Shúilleabháin,
supra note 9; Iliadou, supra note 10; Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in
Cases of Cross-border Surrogacy, supra note 10; Mulligan, supra note 6; Fenton-Glynn,
International Surrogacy Before the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
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Iceland, which also involved a child born through cross-border surrogacy
and their intended, genetically unrelated parents, the Court recognized,
however, de facto family life. 80 While essential in the context of nontraditional families created through (cross-border) reproductive services,
the legal concept of family life 81 and its protection goes beyond the scope
of this paper which focuses on the recognition of the legal parent-child
relationship.
B. Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France
In Mennesson v. France 82 and Labassee v. France 83 the ECtHR
condemned France for infringement of Article 8 ECHR (right to respect
for private and family life). Both cases involved the French authorities’
refusal to recognize parent-child relationships legally established in the
U.S.A. between children born through surrogacy and their intended
parents.
The facts of the two cases are similar. They both involve an oppositesex French couple and their children conceived and born abroad in the
U.S.A. via egg donation, sperm of the French father, and a surrogate
mother. The genetic ties between the children and their French fathers
were established. The U.S. authorities issued a birth certificate
recognizing the intended parents as the legal parents. On the parents’
return to France, the French authorities refused to transcribe the details
of the birth certificates, and thus, the legal parenthood link of the children
with their intended parents, in the Central Civil Register of Births,
Marriages, and Deaths. Although aware that the children had been legally
identified elsewhere as the children of the intended parents, the French
authorities did not recognize their relationship.
80. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17. For a detailed case discussion, see Julian W.
März, What Makes a Parent in Surrogacy Cases? Reflections on the Fjölnisdóttir et al. v.
Iceland Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 21 MED. L. INT’L 272 (2021);
Lydia Bracken, Cross-Border Surrogacy Before the European Court of Human Rights:
Analysis of Valdís Fjölnisdóttir And Others v. Iceland, 28 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1 (2021)
[hereinafter Bracken, Cross Border Surrogacy].
81. The existence or non-existence of “family life” is essentially a question of fact
depending upon the existence of close personal ties. The notion of “family” in Article
8 concerns marriage-based relationships, and also other de facto ”family ties” where the
parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors demonstrate that the
relationship had sufficient constancy. For an excellent summary of the relevant case
law, see Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12.
82. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
83. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145378.
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France justified its refusal to recognize a legal relationship between
children born abroad through surrogacy and the intended parents on
several grounds. French public policy precludes registration in the Central
Civil Register of Births, Marriages, and Deaths if a foreign birth
certificate’s details conflict with essential principles of French law. 84
Under French law, surrogacy agreements are null and void. As such,
French authorities claimed it was contrary to the inalienability of civil
status to give effect to such agreements regarding the legal parent-child
relationship. 85 They also aimed to discourage French nationals from
having recourse outside France to a reproductive technique prohibited
within the country. 86 Finally, French authorities were concerned with
tacitly accepting the circumvention of domestic law, thus “jeopardi[zing]
the consistent application of the provisions outlawing surrogacy.” 87
French law’s failure to recognize the parent-child relationship
affected the applicants’ family life on various levels. As they did not have
French documents, the applicants were obliged to produce the American
civil-status documents, accompanied by a sworn translation, whenever
access to a right or service required proof of the legal parent-child
relationship. These documents were sometimes met with suspicion or
incomprehension. The parents referred to difficulties encountered when
registering their children with social security, enrolling them at a school
canteen or an outdoor center, and applying to the Family Allowances
Office for financial assistance. Furthermore, the applicant children had
not obtained French nationality, which affected the families’ travels,
caused concern regarding the children’s right of residence in France once
they became adults, and undermined the stability of the family unit.
There were also concerns about the authorities’ reaction in the event of
the biological father’s death or the couple’s separation, and concerns
about inheritance. 88
In Mennesson and Labassee, the ECtHR, for the first time, examined
the authorities’ refusal to recognize the parent-child relationship between
children born through surrogacy abroad and the individuals who initiated
the surrogacy to create their family in the domestic legal order.89 First,
the Court specified that there had been an interference in the exercise of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 82.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 82.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 62.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 83.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶¶ 68-91.
See also, for similar, later cases: Foulon v. France, App. No. 9063/14 et 10410/14 (July
21, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165462; Laborie v. France, App. No.
44024/13 (January 19, 2017), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170661.
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the rights guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR not only regarding family life
but also private life of the individuals involved. 90 In its reasoning, the
Court then distinguished between the parents’ and the children’s rights.
Examining the parents’ rights, the Court concluded that the French
authorities’ decision did not cause excessive disruption to their family life.
As they could reside in France together as a family, a just balance is
achieved between the parents’ interest to care for their children and the
state’s interest to discourage the practice of surrogacy. Consequently, the
Court held that the practical consequences and difficulties for their family
life due to the lack of domestic recognition of the legal parent-child
relationship did not amount to a violation of the right to respect for
family life (Article 8 ECHR). The Court argued that de facto family life
is possible even without recognizing a legal parent-child link. 91
The Court then turned to the children’s rights. It recognized that
France might legitimately wish to discourage its citizens while they are
abroad from using ART that is prohibited domestically. However, as the
Court noted, “the effects of non-recognition in French law of the legal
parent-child relationship between children thus conceived and the
intended parents are not limited to the parents alone. . . . They also affect
the children themselves.” 92
Addressing the situation of legal limbo, the Court held that the nonrecognition of the legal parent-child link constitutes a violation of the
child’s right to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR). 93 According to
the Court, respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to
establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which
includes the legal parent-child relationship. 94 In the words of the Court,
“an essential aspect of the identity of individuals is at stake where the legal
parent-child relationship is concerned.” 95 As French law refuses to
recognize the parent-child relationship between the intended parents and
the children, the children find themselves in a state of “legal uncertainty”
undermining their identity within French society. 96 The Court noted that
“uncertainty is liable to have negative repercussions on the definition of
their personal identity.” 97 More specifically, the Court identified
nationality and inheritance rights as relevant elements of a person’s
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 49.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶¶ 92–94.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 99.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 101.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 96.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 80.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 96.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 97.
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identity. 98 Although the children’s genetic father is French, they are
unable to obtain French nationality. 99 Also, the children’s inheritance
rights are “less favorabl[e]” as they can only inherit from the intended
parents as legatees. 100
The Court’s remedy to the situation of legal limbo is, however,
significantly qualified. Its considerations on identity and the legal parentchild relationship rely on an additional component: the intended father
is also the children’s genetic father. The existence of this biological
relationship is decisive in the Court’s findings. As the Court noted, its
analysis of the situation “takes on a special dimension where, as in the
present case, one of the intended parents is also the child’s biological
parent.” 101
The Court underlined “the importance of biological parentage as a
component of identity.” 102 It thus admitted that the right to respect for
private life under Article 8 ECHR includes the right to have one’s descent
established in law, but only insofar as genetic descent is concerned. The
refusal to recognize a parent-child relationship legally established abroad
constitutes a violation of Article 8 ECHR, but only with regard to one of
the intended parents, the genetic parent, and not the other, social parent.
Beyond the child’s identity, the connection of that identity to legal
parenthood, and the importance of genetics, the Court heavily relied on
the child’s best interests standard in its reasoning. The child’s best interest
is a recognized and long-standing legal standard in family law.103 It is also
98. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶¶ 97-98.
99. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 97.
100. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 98. A deceased’s estate is divided among
their legal heirs, i.e., the persons that the law says have the right to inherit their assets,
and other individuals designated as legatees under the terms of the will of the person
who has died. Legal heirs are a deceased person’s spouse or partner (husband, wife, or
registered partner) and their closest relatives (their children, or if they do not have
children, their parents, or siblings). Legal heirs inherit in a predetermined order,
according to their statutory succession rights. The protection offered by the law to legal
heirs is stronger in comparison to the legatee’s status (e.g., statutory entitlement of legal
heirs). Furthermore, a deceased person’s children are normally exempt from
inheritance taxes, while legatees do not typically get such an exemption. Ní
Shúilleabháin, supra note 9, at 109.
101. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 100.
102. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 100.
103. See, e.g., LYDIA BRACKEN, SAME-SEX PARENTING AND THE BEST INTERESTS PRINCIPLE
(2020) [hereinafter Bracken, Same-Sex Parenting]; FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES (ELISABETTA BERGAMINI,
CHIARA RAGNI & FRANCESCO DEANA, EDS. 2019); Geoffrey Willems, La filiation et
l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme, 2018 JOURNAL EUROPÉEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME [EUR. J. HUM. RTS.] 435
(Fr.); Büchler, supra note 15.
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an established standard in the Court’s decision-making. 104 The Court’s
reflections in this context focus on the clash between public policy
considerations regarding surrogacy and the child’s right to respect for
private life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. 105
In line with its established case law, whenever the Court examined
whether a fair balance was struck between the public interest and respect
for private and family life, it highlighted “the essential principle according
to which, whenever the situation of a child is an issue, the best interests
of that child are paramount.” 106
Reducing its analysis of the child’s best interests to genetics, the
Court underlined that:
Having regard to the importance of biological parentage as a
component of identity . . . it cannot be said to be in the
interests of the child to deprive him or her of a legal
relationship of this nature where the biological reality of that
relationship has been established and the child and parent
concerned demand full recognition thereof.107
The ECtHR declared the situation of legal limbo as incompatible
with the child’s best interests. 108 The non-recognition of the legal parentchild relationship severely restricts the child’s ability to establish their
identity in law. Their right to respect for private and family life has thus
been violated. 109 It follows from the Court’s decision, first of all, that the
child’s best interests standard prevails over domestic public policy
considerations regarding surrogacy and adoption. 110 Furthermore, the
child’s best interests are safeguarded if the child’s legal relationship with
one parent, the genetic parent, is recognized.

104. The best interests of the child is a preeminent part of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC), enshrined in Article 3 (“In all actions concerning children . . .
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). See G.A. Res. 44/25,
at 2 (Nov. 20, 1989). The ECtHR has recognized the child’s best interests as an
essential part of the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise, even though the ECHR does
not explicitly refer to the child’s best interests and the ECtHR is not a party to the
UNCRC. See Willems, supra note 103.
105. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶¶ 84, 99.
106. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 81. “[T]he child’s best interests, respect
for which must guide any decision in their regard.” Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
257 at ¶ 99.
107. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶100.
108. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶100.
109. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶101.
110. See Mulligan, supra note 6, at 460.
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C. Advisory Opinion: Adoption as an Acceptable Alternative
The legal status of the relationship between the child and a second,
genetically unrelated, parent (i.e., the intended mother as in Mennesson v.
France 111 and Labassee v. France 112) remained unresolved in these two
cases. The issue came up, again in the French context, when the French
Court of Cassation requested an advisory opinion from the ECtHR. 113
Advisory opinions are a new tool in the ECtHR’s general architecture,
allowing the Court to provide guidance to a requesting domestic court on
Convention issues when determining a case before it, without transferring
a dispute to the ECtHR. 114 Advisory opinions are non-binding and do
not have value of a precedent.
In its request for an advisory opinion, the French Court of Cassation
addressed two questions to the ECtHR: 115 1. Does the non-recognition
of a legal relationship between a child born abroad as the result of a
gestational surrogacy arrangement and their intended mother (designated
as the legal mother in the foreign birth certificate) violate Article 8
ECHR? And should a distinction be drawn according to whether or not
the child was conceived using the eggs of the intended mother? 2. Does
the possibility for the intended mother to adopt the child of her spouse,
the genetically-related father, to establish a legal mother-child
relationship ensure compliance with Article 8 ECHR?
In its first-ever Advisory Opinion, in April 2019, 116 the Court
clarified its position as follows: With regard to the first question, the
Court noted that preventing a child born through surrogacy from
obtaining legal recognition of their relationship with their intended
mother is incompatible with their best interests. 117 Here, the Court’s
analysis of the child’s best interests goes beyond genetics. The Court states
that the best interests standard also includes the child’s legal and
economic interests, including citizenship, welfare benefits, security in case

111. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
112. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145180.
113. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 (April 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engpress?i=003-6380685-8364782.
114. Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border Surrogacy, supra note 10, at 414.
115. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 9.
116. Margaria, Parenthood and Cross-Border Surrogacy, supra note 10.
117. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 42.
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of death or separation of the parents, and inheritance. 118 In the absence
of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, these
interests are threatened. Article 8 ECHR, protecting the child’s right to
respect for private life, thus requires that domestic law provide a
possibility to recognize a legal parent-child relationship with the intended
mother, designated in the foreign birth certificate as the “legal mother.” 119
If the intended mother is also the genetic mother, “the Court considers it
important to emphasise that… the need to provide a possibility of
recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended
mother applies with even greater force in such a case.”120
In response to the second question, the Court noted that, contrary
to the recognition that the legal parent-child link touches the child’s very
identity, the choice of means by which to realize such recognition is less
significant. 121 The Court thus allowed a wide margin of appreciation for
the Member States to choose how they decide to recognize the legal
relationship between the child and the intended parents. 122 The Court
noted that adoption is an acceptable alternative to registering the foreign
birth certificate, allowing for the legal recognition of the parent-child
relationship between the second intended parent and the child.123
According to the Court, adoption “with regard to the recognition of that
relationship, produces similar effects to registration of the foreign birth
details.” 124 It follows that Article 8 ECHR does not impose a general
obligation on the Member States to recognize from the beginning a legal
118. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 40 (“The lack of recognition of a legal
relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement carried out abroad
and the intended mother thus has a negative impact on several aspects of that child’s
right to respect for [their] private life. In general terms, . . . the non-recognition in
domestic law of the relationship between the child and the intended mother is
disadvantageous to the child, as it places him or her in a position of legal uncertainty
regarding his or her identity within society. . . . In particular, there is a risk that such
children will be denied the access to their intended mother’s nationality which the legal
parent-child relationship guarantees; it may be more difficult for them to remain in
their intended mother’s country of residence (although this risk does not arise in the
case before the Court of Cassation, as the intended father, who is also the biological
father, has French nationality); their right to inherit under the intended mother’s estate
may be impaired; their continued relationship with her is placed at risk if the intended
parents separate or the intended father dies; and they have no protection should their
intended mother refuse to take care of them or cease doing so.”). Advisory Opinion,
App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 40.
119. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 46.
120. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 47.
121. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 51.
122. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 51.
123. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 53.
124. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 53.
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parent-child relationship by registering the details of the foreign birth
certificate of a child born through cross-border surrogacy. However, the
Court suggested that an adoption procedure must be readily and
effectively available to safeguard the child’s best interests. 125
V. D V. FRANCE: THE ECTHR’S GENDER DISCRIMINATORY
TWIST TO GENETIC ESSENTIALISM
In the recent case D v. France, the ECtHR faced a slightly different
set of facts which presented the issue of recognizing legal parenthood for
a child born through cross-border surrogacy.126 In this case, the child was
born in Ukraine in 2012 to a French opposite-sex couple who had hired
a surrogate mother. The child’s birth certificate named the intended
father and mother as the legal parents without mentioning the woman
who had given birth to the child. French authorities registered the foreign
birth certificate with regard to the details of the intended genetic father.
However, they refused to record in the Central Civil Register of Births,
Marriages, and Deaths the details of the child’s birth certificate so far as
the certificate designated the intended mother, who was also the child’s
genetic mother, as the legal mother. 127
Taking their case to the ECtHR, the father, the mother, and the
child complained of a violation of the child’s right to respect for private
life (Article 8 ECHR) and discrimination on the grounds of birth in the
enjoyment of that right (Article 14 ECHR). 128 In its decision, the Court
concluded that there was no violation of the child’s right to respect for
private life (Article 8 ECHR). It noted that France did not overstep its
margin of appreciation when refusing to register the details of the foreign
birth certificate in the French register of births, insofar as the certificate
designated the child’s intended and genetic mother. 129
Referring to its previous case law on cross-border surrogacy, the
Court held that
[T]he existence of a genetic link did not mean that the child’s
right to respect for his or her private life required the legal
relationship with the intended father to be established
specifically by means of the recording of the details of the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶¶ 54–55.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 (July 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/H74R-QEDE].
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 1–10.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 29, 73.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 71–72.

150

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER

&

LAW

[Vol. 29:121

foreign birth certificate. The Court saw no reason in the
circumstances of the present case to reach a different decision
regarding recognition of the legal relationship with the
intended mother, who was the child’s genetic mother.130
However, the protection of the child’s right to respect for private life
(Article 8 ECHR) demands access to an effective and sufficiently speedy
mechanism that allows for the recognition of the legal relationship
between the child and the genetic mother. 131 In a clear parallel to its
Advisory Opinion, 132 it is decisive for the Court that the refusal to register
the foreign birth certificate does not preclude domestic recognition of the
legal parent-child relationship since the mother-child link can be legally
established through adoption. 133 The Court reiterated that “adoption
produced similar effects to registration of the foreign birth details when
it came to recognising the legal relationship between the child and the
intended mother.” 134 Thus, the Court concluded that the adoption of her
husband’s child (second-parent adoption) constituted a readily and
effectively available procedure enabling the legal relationship between the
intended mother and the child to be recognized. 135
The Court also dealt with the complaint relating to the difference in
treatment between French children born through cross-border surrogacy
and other French children born abroad. The Court recognized that the
latter can demand registration of the foreign birth certificate’s details and
thus obtain a direct recognition of the legal mother-child relationship.
For children born through cross-border surrogacy, however, the intended
mother has to go through a regular domestic adoption procedure to
establish the same legal parenthood link. The Court reiterated its finding
that “adoption of the spouse’s child constituted in the present case an
effective mechanism for recognition of the legal relationship” between the
mother and the child. 136
The Court did not consider this difference in treatment to be
discriminatory. It even noted that “this difference in treatment regarding
130. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 58–59.
131. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 64–70.
132. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 (April 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engpress?i= 003-6380685-8364782.
133. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 62.
134. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 66.
135. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 70.
136. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 85.
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the means of establishing the legal mother-child relationship was designed
to ensure, in the specific circumstances of each case, that it was in the best
interests of the child born through surrogacy for such a relationship to be
established with the intended mother.” 137 In the Court’s view, the
difference in treatment thus has an objective and reasonable justification:
to verify that the second parent adoption by the intended, genetic mother
is in the child’s best interests. As a result, the Court held that there was
no violation of Article 14 ECHR in relation to Article 8 ECHR.138
The Court did not address the difference in treatment between the
intended genetic father, who benefited from registration of the foreign
birth certificate and being directly recognized as the legal father, and the
intended genetic mother, for whom the French authorities refused such
registration. 139 In the domestic judicial proceedings leading up to the
ECtHR proceeding, the parents did not raise violations of their rights as
intended and genetic father and mother. 140 They only raised rights
violations regarding the child, 141 potentially influenced by the Court’s
previous surrogacy judgments in which it only considered the child’s
rights as relevant. 142 In addition, the parents revealed that the intended
mother was the genetic mother only very late in the proceedings. 143
Consequently, the Court refused to consider alleged rights violations
regarding the intended genetic mother based on procedural reasons. 144
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Social Change and the Judiciary
The social understanding of the family is subject to constant change.
Although the traditional family has consisted of two married opposite-sex
adults and their biological children, families have changed significantly

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 86.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 89.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 81–82.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 61.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 61.
Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 81.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 61, 81-82.
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over the last half-century and even longer. 145 ART, while not the only
factors, are significant contributors to this change. 146
The progress of ART and the pluralism of families created by ART
have overrun the law’s channeling functions and social control.147 Even
though family law and ART regulation might be designed to channel the
avenues of family creation and restrict the creation of non-traditional
families, couples and individuals find ways to access ART and surrogacy,
most importantly by travelling abroad. The legal limbo that nontraditional families then find themselves in reveals the relative gap in the
law’s response to recognize new forms of familial relationships. The gap
is “relative” in that the law always remains slow to catch up with fastpaced social change.
The ECtHR’s case law suggests that the judiciary adheres to existing
legal standards, such as the child’s best interests, to regularize the social
realities of non-traditional families and transform them into legal realities.
With Mennesson v. France 148 and Labassee v. France, 149 the Court imposed
recognition in the domestic context of non-traditional families created
through cross-border surrogacy. The Court’s reasoning and decisions in
these and subsequent cases mandated the direct recognition of the legal
parent-child relationship based on the foreign birth certificate, at least for
genetically-related, intended fathers. 150 By denouncing the situation of
legal limbo as a violation of the ECHR, the Court brought about a

145. Holtzman, supra note 15, at 618; Paul C. Glick, Fifty Years of Family Demography: A
Record of Social Change, 50 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 861 (1988); Lori Kowaleski-Jones and
Rachel Dunifon, Children’s home environments: Understanding the role of family
structure changes, 25 J. Fam. Issues 3–28 (2004).
146. DOLGIN, supra note 2, at 1-2.
147. See McClain, supra note 47, at 2141-44 (explaining how ART assisted in making
motherhood without marriage more viable as an example of circumventing the
channeling function of marriage).
148. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
149. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145180.
150. See, e.g., Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Labassee, App. No. 65941/11; Foulon
v. France, App. No. 9063/14 et 10410/14, (July 21, 2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-164968; Laborie v. France, App No. 44024/13 (January 19, 2017),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170369; C and E v. France, App. No. 1462/18
et 17348/18 (November 19, 2019), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-199497; D
v. France, App. No. 11288/18 (July 16, 2020), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001203565. See also, Paradiso v. Italy, App. No. 25358/12 (January 24, 2017),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170359; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App.
No. 71552/17 (May 18, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209992
(refusing to impose an obligation to recognize a legal parent-child relationship, based
on the absence of a genetic link between the intended parents and the child).
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slightly more inclusive and liberal approach in the legal recognition of
non-traditional families. 151
These are positive developments demonstrating that the Court’s
stance reacts to societal change and contributes to legal change. However,
as in the cases discussed, this liberalization is accompanied by two major
flaws in how the Court justified its decisions: genetic essentialism first,
and then a gender-discriminatory twist in how legal motherhood and
fatherhood are conceived. The remainder of this paper critically analyzes
these two flaws and speculates about the future trajectory of the Court’s
jurisprudence.
The legal recognition of non-traditional families created abroad
brings us back to the question of the adequacy of the still very narrow
(i.e., heteronormative, bionormative, favoring marital supremacy)
domestic definitions of the family which many European states still
adhere to in their regulation of family law and access to ART. A normative
critique is not the purpose of this paper. However, a brief remark is
necessary. One of the drawbacks of the ECtHR’s push for more inclusive
definitions of family and legal parent-child relationships is that it offers
only a solution after the fact based on the recognition method.152
Although capable of reducing situations of legal limbo, this method offers
a solution in individual cases but does not address the broader issue of
restrictive domestic ART regulations forcing couples and individuals to
use cross-border fertility services.
Adding reproductive justice to the picture, recognition, and
regularization by the judiciary of social realities created through crossborder reproductive services provide a solution only for those who can
afford such services. It does not address the injustice imposed on those
who lack the financial means to do so. Whether the mechanism of private
international law is appropriate for driving legal change in the domestic
context goes beyond the scope of this paper.153 However, one might hope
151. This liberalization phenomenon occurred in other areas of the ECtHR’s case law as
well. See e.g., Büchler, supra note 15 (discussing the Court’s precedents on adoption in
non-traditional families and recognition of de facto family life); Storrow, Proportionality
Problem, supra note 9, at 143 (discussing the ECtHR’s role in addressing the status of
“illegitimate” children born out of wedlock and the discrimination against nonmarital
children that lingered in the latter half of the twentieth century).
152. Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
153. Claire Fenton-Glynn, Review Article: Human Rights and Private International Law:
Regulating International Surrogacy, 10 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 157-69 (2014); Claire FentonGlynn, Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International Surrogacy Arrangements,
24 MED. L. REV. 59-75 (2016); Fenton-Glynn, International Surrogacy Before the
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9.
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that judicial recognition in cross-border cases reflects the first step in a
trend towards more liberal and inclusive domestic legal frameworks
regulating family law and access to ART. 154
As a social construct, the law naturally undergoes change that reflects
new phenomena and needs within society. 155 This change, essentially
political, must follow the usual legitimation processes in constitutional
democracies. Having judges fight out disagreements about matters of
baby and family making, or nature and technology, offers no guarantee
that society’s majority will come any closer to appreciating views with
which it disagrees. However, judicial discourse has the power to shape the
structure of moral and political debate.156 It serves as an impetus for the
legislature who is ultimately responsible for democratically legitimized
law reform and establishes the human rights framework in which such
law reform can materialize.
B. The Power of the Genetic Link and Biological Truth
The language emerging in Mennesson v. France 157 and Labassee v.
France 158 emphasizes the significance of the genetic link when recognizing
legal parenthood, at least for fatherhood. 159 A similar pattern emerged in
another cross-border surrogacy case, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy,
although the outcome for the child was very different since none of the
intended parents were genetically related. 160 In this case, the applicants
were Italian nationals who entered into a surrogacy agreement with a
woman in Russia. The child, conceived through IVF, was born in 2011.
The surrogate mother signed a document confirming that the baby was
the applicants’ genetic child. The Russian authorities issued a birth
certificate designating the applicants as parents without mentioning that
154. See generally Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 10; Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9; Mulligan, supra note 6.
155. Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction: Rewriting Life, Reframing Rights, in REFRAMING RIGHTS:
BIOCONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GENETIC AGE 1, 1-27 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011).
156. Baer, supra note 16; Melanie Levy, The Rise of the Swiss Regulatory Healthcare State: On
Preserving the Just in the Quest for the Better (or Less Expensive?), REGUL. &
GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2020), [https://perma.cc/33HR-T3YH].
157. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
158. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145180.
159. MARGARIA, supra note 4; Mulligan, supra note 6. See also Advisory Opinion, App. No.
P16-2018-001 (noting that “to date, it has placed some emphasis in its case-law on the
existence of a biological link with at least one of the intended parents”). Id.
160. See Paradiso v. Italy, App. No. 25358/12; see also Iliadou, supra note 10 (discussing
this case in detail).
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the child had been born through surrogacy. When the applicants returned
to Italy with the child, they unsuccessfully tried to register the birth. The
applicants were then charged with misrepresentation of civil status and
violation of the adoption legislation prohibiting the adoption of such a
young child. 161
During the proceedings in Italy, it was revealed that neither of the
intended parents were genetically related to the child. Due to an error in
the Russian clinic, the intended father’s sperm was not used to fertilize
the donor egg. Considering the absence of a genetic link to the intended
parents, an Italian court ordered removal the child from the applicants.
The child was placed in a children’s home and later foster care without
any contact with the applicants or formal identity. 162
The Court in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy did not address legal
parenthood directly but focused on the Italian authorities’ actions leading
to the permanent separation of the applicants from the child. The Court’s
analysis revolved around the definition and protection of family life. The
ECtHR Grand Chamber accepted the child’s removal from their
intended parents by the Italian authorities. It concluded that there was
no family life, not even de facto family life, and upheld the Italian
authorities’ decision to put the child in foster care and eventually giving
it up for adoption. The absence of a genetic link was decisive in the
Court’s finding.163 As Mulligan notes, “the Court in Paradiso concluded
that even the good faith belief on the part of the intended father that he
was in fact the genetic father of the child was not enough to make up for
the absence of a genetic link. . . .” 164
Comparing Mennesson and Labassee with Paradiso, it becomes
evident that in the context of cross-border surrogacy, when at least one of
the intended parents is genetically related to the child, some protection is
granted to the intended parents and the child. If the intended parents
believe that their genetic material was used to create the embryo, but due
to an error in the clinic, this did not occur, the parents and the child are
left unprotected. 165 Shuilleabhain heavily criticizes this outcome, noting
that,
Ultimately Paradiso signifies that the absence of a genetic tie
(even in the event of an accidental clinic error) will catapult a
relationship from the realm of cherished family ties (deserving
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12 at ¶¶ 9-21.
Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12 at ¶¶ 22-33, 49-53.
Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12 at ¶ 157.
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 469.
Iliadou, supra note 10, at 151.
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of the highest Article 8 ECHR protection) into a detestable
‘human trafficking’ classification. This binary perspective –
and polarisation of the two situations – is rather extreme, and
potentially very unfair from the perspective of affected
children. 166
The ECtHR follows the same reasoning in Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and
Others v. Iceland. 167 In this case, a same-sex couple from Iceland had a
child through sperm and egg donors and a surrogate mother in the United
States. Both intended mothers were genetically unrelated to the child.
Upon the couple’s return to Iceland with the child, domestic authorities
refused to recognize a parental link between either mother and the child,
noting that since there was no genetic relatedness, there was no reason to
do so. The child thus remained without legal parents. However, the child
is allowed to live with their intended parents as part of a foster care
arrangement. 168 In its decision, the ECtHR again upheld the nonrecognition of a legal parent-child relationship. 169
In its cross-border surrogacy precedents, the Court insists on the
concept of biological truth to establish legal parenthood. 170 As Mulligan
notes, “the identity cases emphasise the importance of biological truth,
the significance of the search for that truth and the importance of
reflecting that truth in State documents.” 171 Interestingly, the Court’s
focus on the genetic or biological aspects of parenthood as a basis for its
normative arguments transpires not only in its case law dealing with a
situation of legal limbo created through the use of cross-border fertility
services but also in cases without a cross-border element. The ECtHR
case Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany, 172 for example, involved two
women living in a registered civil partnership. They complained about

166. Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9, at 109. See also Mulligan, supra note 6, at 474
(comparing Paradiso and Mennesson, to show that the Paradiso court focused more on
legality and less on the best interest of the child).
167. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App. No. 71552/17 (May 18, 2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-209992; See März, supra note 80 (discussing this
case in detail); Bracken, Cross Border Surrogacy, supra note 80 (discussing this case in
detail).
168. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17 at ¶¶ 8-25.
169. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17 at ¶ 75.
170. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 459.
171. Id.
172. Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany, App. No. 8017/11 (May 7, 2013),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/docx/pdf?library=ECHR&id=001120617&filename=BOECKEL%20AND%20GESSNERBOECKEL%20v.%20GERMANY.pdf.
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the German authorities’ refusal to register one of them as a parent on the
birth certificate of the other partner’s child born during their partnership.
The non-biological mother had to undergo an adoption procedure to be
recognized as the second parent. 173 Relying on Articles 8 ECHR (right to
respect for private and family life) and 14 ECHR (prohibition of
discrimination), the applicants argued that there was no reasonable
justification for allowing a biological mother’s husband to be entered on
a birth certificate as the child’s father (legal presumption of fatherhood)
while refusing to enter the biological mother’s same-sex civil partner. The
applicants argued that there was no reason to treat children born into a
civil partnership differently from children born in wedlock. 174
Based on its established jurisprudence, for the ECtHR to analyze a
case under Article 14, a difference in the treatment of persons in similar
situations must occur. Such a difference in treatment is discriminatory if
it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does
not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is no reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realized. 175 In Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany, the Court held that
the applicants—bound by a registered civil partnership—were not in a
relevantly similar situation to a married husband and wife regarding the
entries made on the birth certificate. 176 The Court’s main argument
emphasized that domestic law relies on a legal presumption according to
which the man married to the mother at the time of birth is the child’s
biological father. This construct is “not called into question by the fact
that this legal presumption might not always reflect the true descent.” 177
In the case of a same-sex couple, however, it can, with certainty, be ruled
on biological grounds that the child only descends from one of the
partners. Therefore, there is “no factual foundation for a legal
presumption” that the child descends from the other partner as well. 178 It
is noteworthy that the Court concentrated on the biological differences
between different-sex and same-sex couples. It excluded the recognition
of a legal presumption based on these biological differences, even though
one might think that the legal presumption is based on the institution of
marriage or civil partnership and not the possibility of biological descent.
What follows from the Court’s stance is that a legal presumption is only
admissible if there is a hypothetical possibility that it matches the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶¶ 2-15.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶ 6.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶ 28.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶ 31.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶ 30.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel, App. No. 8017/11 at ¶ 30.

158

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER

&

LAW

[Vol. 29:121

biological reality. 179 As a consequence, the Court rejected the case, stating
that there was no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.
The ECtHR’s precedents clearly reveal the power of the genetic link.
Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany demonstrates that the Court’s
focus on biological relatedness is not limited to cross-border surrogacy
cases. Through these recent cases, one might suspect genetic essentialism
sweeping through the area of family law and ART regulation, as genetics
are the main criterion for recognizing legal parenthood. Bender defines
genetic essentialism as follows:
Genetic essentialism asserts that our genes and our DNA are
the essence, the core, the most important constituent part of
who we are as human beings . . . . Genetic essentialism reduces
human beings to the contents of our cells. It ignores the ways
our cells and environments interrelate, the ways our
physiological system functions as a whole organism, and the
ways our minds and hearts affect our being. Additionally,
genetic essentialism renders all our ways of nurturing and
being nurtured by one another for naught. 180
The genetic connection based on biological truth, as relied on by the
Court, encourages a biologically determined view of parenting, which
does not reflect the lived reality of non-traditional families. One of the
reasons it doesn’t line up with modern conceptions of parenting is due to
ART, which enable non-biologically determinative family creation. 181
Couples and individuals escape bionormativity by engaging in crossborder reproductive services only to be confronted with legal standards
focusing on genetics in order to recognize legal parenthood or requiring
additional legal hurdles such as the adoption process once back home.
While advances in ART enables society to discard the naturalness
argument in reproduction and family making and allows for the creation
of more diversified families, the ECtHR seems to confine itself to the
traditional view of the family by defining identity and best interests in
179. For a similar critic in the context of US law, see Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward:
Extending Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30
YALE J.L. & FEM. 99 (2018) [hereinafter Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward]. See also
Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the Modern Era,
104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 244 (2019) (discussing how the inconsistency was resolved
by the US Supreme Court in its decisions Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down bans
on same-sex marriage, and Pavan v. Smith, which held that states must equally provide
opportunities to any spouses to be listed on a child’s birth certificate).
180. Bender, supra note 14, at 4.
181. Campbell, supra note 14.
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genetic terms. 182 A possible reading of the ECtHR’s emphasis on the
importance of the genetic link when recognizing legal parenthood in nontraditional families could be that while ART allow for more diversified
social realities, the availability of genetic testing nudges towards a
narrower legal definition of the parent-child relationship based on
verifiable genetic relatedness. Scientific progress thus acts both as a
facilitator and constraint for family diversity.
The ECtHR case law is by no means an exception but corroborates
research findings on the interaction between the law and genetics. Several
scholars have demonstrated that the idea of genetics as the preeminent
determinant of parenthood is experiencing a resurgence in the law.
Hendricks describes an “increasing commitment again—in both law and
culture—to genes as the essence, the sine qua non, the definitional
element of parenthood.” 183 According to Meyer, this phenomenon is
linked to the increasing availability of genetic testing. 184 He also notes
that this development “reveals a reflexive commitment to biology as the
essential foundation of parenthood.” 185
The “geneticization” phenomenon or genetic essentialism might
have an impact on how European societies define the family. By the end
of the 20th century, legal definitions of the family had become more
inclusive and pluralistic, even in Europe, increasingly emphasizing social
and emotional bonds rather than biological relatedness and embracing
non-traditional families. A re-emphasis on the genetic link by the
judiciary, as witnessed in the recent ECtHR case law, might alter how the
family is defined, both legally and socially, risking a breakdown of more
inclusive and pluralistic definitions of family. 186 The application of
genetics in the realm of family law and ART regulation might cause the
concept of “biological family” to become preeminent again. 187
C. Right to Know One’s Origins
In the broader view of things, the ECtHR’s focus on the child’s
identity, best interests, and genetics must be considered together with the
Court’s jurisprudence recognizing a new individual human right to know
182. Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11, ¶¶ 99-100 (June 26, 2014).
183. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Genetic Essentialism in Family Law, 26 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.MED. 109, 109 (2016).
184. Meyer, supra note 14, at 126.
185. Id. at 139.
186. SCHWENZER, supra note 47, at 2.
187. Caulfield, supra note 15, at 69-70.
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one’s origins as protected by Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private
and family life). The Court has developed this body of case law in recent
years. 188
The Court has gradually recognized knowledge about one’s origins
as an essential part of one’s identity. 189 The right to know the identity of
one’s biological parents, or one’s genetic inheritance, has come to be
viewed as something substantial to the human and its well-being. The
Court defines the right to know one’s origins as a right to have
uncertainty as to one’s identity eliminated and underscores the genetic
link as an essential part of one’s identity or identity building.190 In this
context, the Court also noted that birth, particularly the circumstances in
which a child is born, form part of a child’s, and subsequently an adult’s,
private life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. 191 The Court’s case law that
created a human right to know one’s origins developed in various areas of
family law, such as the status of minors under the guardianship of a public
administration and adopted children, and to justify claims to non-marital
paternity. 192

188. See generally Richard Blauwhoff & Lisette Frohn, International Commercial Surrogacy
Arrangements: The Interests of the Child as a Concern of Both Human Rights and Private
International Law, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES 211 (Christophe Paulussen et al. eds.,
2016); Kessler, supra note 6; Mulligan, supra note 6.
189. See e.g., Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, App. No. 238/90 (December 20, 2007),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84106; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 143; Çolak v. Turkey, App. No. 60176/00 (May 30, 2006)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-75510; Jäggi v. Switzerland, 2006-X Eur. Ct.
H.R. 21, Kalacheva v. Russia, App. No. 3451/05 (May 7, 2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92572; Grönmark v. Finland, App. No. 17038
/04 (July 6, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105630; Backlund v.
Finland, App. No. 36498/05 (July 6, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00199784; Pascaud v. France, App. No. 19535/08 (June 16, 2011),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105158; A. M. M. v. Romania, App. No. 2151
/10 (February 14, 2012), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-38445924417275; Godelli v. Italy, App. No.
33783/09 (September 25, 2012),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-113460; Laakso v. Finland, App. No. 7361/05
(January 15, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115861; Röman v. Finland,
App. No. 13072/05 (January 29, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001115864; Gaskin v. UK, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (1989); Odièvre
v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.53.
190. See, e.g., Odièvre, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.5 at ¶ 29.
191. Odièvre, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.5 at ¶ 29.
192. See, e.g., Phinikaridou, App. No. 238/90; Mikulić, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 143; Çolak,
App. No. 60176/00; Jäggi, 2006-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, Kalacheva, App. No. 3451/05;
Grönmark, App. No. 17038/04; Backlund, App. No. 36498/05; Pascaud, App. No.
19535/08; A. M. M. v. Romania, App. No. 2151/10; Godelli, App. No. 33783/09;
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The new emphasis on biology or genetics is, for example, visible in
adoption law. Based on the right to know one’s origins, the ECtHR has
allowed adopted children to trace their birth parents, declaring domestic
laws imposing anonymity in adoption procedures to violate the ECHR.
The Court has thus lifted the veil of anonymity which has surrounded
adoption for decades. 193 The link to birth parents is more readily
accessible today, “despite the overwhelming emotional, social and
financial contributions of the nurturing parents, that is, the adoptive
parents . . . .” 194 The ECtHR’s recognition of a human right to know
one’s origins has indirectly led to another development. States have
pursued law reform on a domestic level to lift the veil of anonymity
surrounding sperm donors and allow children born of sperm donation to
trace and identify their biological fathers. 195
Most recently, the ECtHR further underscored the importance of
genetic parentage and knowledge about one’s genetic origins as an
essential part of one’s identity. In Mandet v. France, the Court dealt with
the quashing of a paternity recognition made by the mother’s husband at
the request of the child’s biological father. 196 The mother was not married
at the time of birth and the man whom she later married signed a
paternity recognition, thus becoming the child’s legal father. This case
did not involve ART. The applicants—the mother, her husband, and the
child—complained about the quashing of the paternity recognition and
the removal of the child’s legitimation. They considered these measures
to be disproportionate interference with the child’s best interests, which,
they submitted, required that the legal parent-child relationship,
established for several years, be maintained and that his emotional
stability be preserved. 197
The Court held that there was no violation of Article 8 ECHR (right
to respect for private and family life). It noted the French courts’ decisions
placed the child’s best interests at the heart of their considerations.
Although the child considered his mother’s husband his father, his
interests lay primarily in knowing the truth about his origins.198 The

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Laakso, App. No. 7361/05; Röman, App. No. 13072/05; Gaskin, App. No. 10454/83,
12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (1989); Odièvre, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.53.
E.g., Odièvre, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R.5; Godelli, App. No. 33783/09.
Deech, supra note 37, at 700.
Caulfield, supra note 15, at 76; Elizabeth J. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth
Registration in Donor-Assisted Reproduction, in the Interest of Science and Human Rights,
48 N.M. L. REV. 416 (2018).
Mandet v. France, App. No. 30955/12 (Jan. 14, 2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-159795.
Mandet, App. No. 30955/12 at ¶ 22.
Mandet, App. No. 30955/12 at ¶ 56.

162

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER

&

LAW

[Vol. 29:121

Court held that the child’s best interests do not necessarily lie where the
child perceives them—in maintaining the parent-child relationship as
established and in preserving emotional stability—but rather in
ascertaining his “real paternity.” 199 The Court argued that the domestic
decisions did not unduly favor the biological father’s interests over those
of the child, but held that the child’s and biological father’s interests
overlapped. 200 Going beyond an individual right to know one’s origins,
Mandet v. France seems to imply an individual’s obligation to know or
recognize their genetic origins and to have a legal parent-child
relationship established that reflects this genetic relatedness.
The case law recognizing an individual human right to know one’s
origins contributes to exaggerating the normative value of biological
relatedness. 201 The interests involved in this context not only include the
right to obtain information regarding one’s genetic parentage, but also in
having biological truth recognized as a matter of law. 202 The ECtHR’s
focus on the genetic link when considering legal parenthood in crossborder surrogacy cases is evidently part of the same school of thought.
D. What’s Genetics Got to Do with Identity and Best Interests?
The Court’s recognition of the legal parent-child relationship as an
essential element of a child’s identity, connected to the right to know
one’s origins, expresses that the gap between the social and legal realities
of children in non-traditional families and the question of how to deal
with the situation of legal limbo is not just a theoretical thought
experiment. The legal parent-child relationship is an essential part of
one’s identity as an individual human being. In the Court’s
understanding, identity is “almost exclusively conceived of as being
important for the purposes of self-formation, and self-development.” 203
However, as discussed, the Court’s precedents focus on “the concept
of biological truth; it is this biological truth and its legal recognition that
the Court views as central to the formation of personal identity.” 204 One
must know one’s genetic heritage to be able to form one’s personality.
199. Mandet, App. No. 30955/12 at ¶ 57.
200. Mandet, App. No. 30955/12. Because the French courts conferred parental
responsibility to the mother, their decisions had not prevented the child from
continuing to live as part of the Mandet family, in accordance with his wishes. Mandet,
App. No. 30955/12.
201. Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9, at 106.
202. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 462.
203. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 471.
204. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 469.
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Interestingly, as Mulligan notes, the Court’s reasoning reveals that
“[t]here is no real sense in which knowledge of genetic heritage is
necessary for practical reasons such as medical or inheritance concerns.” 205
When declaring that the recognition of a legal parent-child link with
the genetic parent is an essential element of the child’s identity, the
ECtHR does not provide any empirical evidence to support the
predominant role of genetics, as opposed to “the social,” for the formation
of a child’s identity. The scientific literature seems to be pointing in the
opposite direction, noting that a child’s well-being and thus their best
interests mainly depend on the nature and strength of the relationship
with the parent, and not the existence of a blood relationship. 206
The ECtHR’s concept of identity as being exclusively linked to
genetic and biological facts is disconnected from children’s lived reality
which is composed of a much broader and richer concept of identity. 207
A child has both social and biological identities. 208 The right to identity,
as prescribed by Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), includes “the right of the child to preserve
his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as
recognized by law without unlawful interference.” 209 The ECtHR’s
narrow focus on genetics and disregard of social parenthood seems
disconnected from the protection guaranteed by Article 8 of the
UNCRC. Mulligan argues that “intention is an essential aspect of
parenthood in assisted reproduction, and thus the relationship to the
intended parent should be captured by the Article 8 right to identity.” 210
A child’s identity is as strongly defined by link to the social parent as it is
by the link to the genetic parent.
Beyond the issue of identity, the child’s best interest standard plays
an important role in the Court’s reasoning in the cross-border surrogacy
and legal parenthood cases. An established standard in the Court’s

Mulligan, supra note 6, at 471.
Caulfield, supra note 15, at 71, 90.
LECKEY, supra note 2, at 65.
See Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 21 INT’L. J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 137–59 (2007); Mulligan, supra note
6; Campbell, supra note 14; R. Alta Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal Decision
Making: The Parent Trap, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 265 (1994).
209. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
210. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 472.

205.
206.
207.
208.
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decision-making is that whenever a child’s interests are at stake, those
interests receive primary consideration. 211
However, in the case law discussed, the Court links the child’s best
interests, identity, and genetics. As with the child’s identity, the Court
considers the child’s well-being predominantly through the lens of
biological relatedness and genetics. 212 The Court embraces the idea that
it is in a child’s best interests to establish a legal relationship with their
genetic parent(s). To safeguard the child’s best interests, it is not necessary
to recognize legal parenthood with the two intended parents, that is, the
two individuals that are usually equally involved in the project of creating
a family. One link is sufficient, as long as it is the link with a genetic
parent. 213 The Court does not address “the social,” that is, the parentchild link with a social parent, as part of the child’s best interests.
In Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, 214 the absence of a genetic link
to both intended parents pushes the ECtHR assessment of the child’s best
interests even further. 215 As Mulligan notes,
[T]he Paradiso court placed its focus far more on the illegal
actions of the applicants and the State’s interest in addressing
this, rather than on the interests or welfare of the child. The
reason for this difference seems to be the fact that the genetic
link existed in Mennesson but not in Paradiso, giving the
parents standing to advance the children’s interests, causing
the right to identity being engaged, and ultimately leading to
a narrower margin of appreciation and a much higher degree
of scrutiny. 216

211. The best interests of the child is a preeminent part of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC), enshrined in Article 3 (“In all actions concerning children . . .
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”). The ECtHR has
recognized the child’s best interests as an essential part of the Article 8 ECHR balancing
exercise, even though the ECtHR does not explicitly refer to the child’s best interests
and the ECtHR is not a party to the UNCRC. See Holtzman, supra note 15.
212. Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights,
supra note 10, at 280; Mulligan, supra note 6.
213. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 100.
214. Paradiso v. Italy, App. No. 25358/12 (January 24, 2017), [https://perma.cc/Y5YBEKLW]. For a detailed case discussion, see Iliadou, supra note 10.
215. See Mulligan, supra note 6; Bracken, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child in Cases of
Cross-border Surrogacy, supra note 10; Trimmings, supra note 15.
216. Mulligan, supra note 6, at 474.
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This pattern repeats itself in Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland, in
which, in the absence of a genetic link to the two intended parents, no
legal parent-child relationship was recognized. 217
Based on the ECtHR jurisprudence, the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, for example, has ruled that in cross-border surrogacy cases in
which none of the intended parents is genetically related to the child,
authorities must not recognize a legal parent-child relationship. 218 This
legal reasoning leaves the child in a precarious situation, as they might be
placed with a foster family and be given up for adoption. The ECtHR
accepted such an outcome caused by the Italian authorities’ actions in
Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy. 219 To be forcefully given up for adoption
instead of growing up with the intended parents who initiated the
creation of their family seems contrary to the child’s best interests
standard. It places a child in an unstable and vulnerable position,
potentially for a prolonged time, while adoption proceedings are pending.
The outcome in Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland is similar,
although less severe. 220 The Court again confirmed the non-recognition
of a parental link between the intended parents and their genetically
unrelated child. However, it allows for the child to grow up in their de
facto family.
There is an inherent contradiction between the ECtHR’s affirmation
that the child’s best interests are paramount and the simultaneous,
exclusive focus on the genetic link. In its case law, the ECtHR neglects to
acknowledge that the child’s best interests go beyond genetics. 221 Only in
the Advisory Opinion the Court mentions that the best interests standard
also includes the child’s legal and economic interests, including
citizenship, immigration status, welfare benefits, security in case of

217. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland App. No. 71552/17 (May 18, 2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-209992%22]}. For a
detailed case discussion, see März, supra note 80; Bracken, Cross Border Surrogacy, supra
note 80.
218. There are two precedents of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court which follow the
ECtHR’s case law. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 21, 2015,
141 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 312
[https://perma.cc/WJS7-GFC3] [Swiss Same-sex Case]; Bundesgericht [BGer]
[Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 14, 2015 141 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 328 [https://perma.cc/KT5QNMPV] [Swiss Opposite-sex Case]. For more examples of domestic case law in the
aftermath of the relevant ECtHR precedents, see Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent
Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, supra note 10.
219. Paradiso, App. No. 25358/12.
220. Valdís Fjölnisdóttir, App. No. 71552/17.
221. Caulfield, supra note 15.
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separation or death of the parents, and inheritance. 222 In the absence of a
legal parent-child link with the intended, non-genetically related, parent,
the protection of these interests is incomplete. The Court eventually
mitigates its incoherent position on the child’s best interests by stating, in
the Advisory Opinion and later also in D v. France, that adoption must be
readily and effectively available for the second intended parent. 223
E. Disregarding the Social
The ECtHR’s focus on biology leads to tensions arising between
genetic and social parenthood. In Mennesson v. France 224 and Labassee v.
France, 225 the Court does not address the legal parenthood of the social,
i.e., genetically unrelated, intended parent (in both cases, this is the
mother). The Court considers the situation of legal limbo with regard to
the relationship between the child and their intended, non-genetically
related parent, as compatible with the ECHR. Its stance is that genetics
are an essential aspect of a child’s identity and best interests, but the legal
recognition of a parent-child link with the social parent is not. 226 In the
Advisory Opinion and D v. France, the Court has since slightly
backtracked on this position, stating that an alternative means of
recognizing legal parentage with the social parent is necessary, for example
through adoption.227
Nevertheless, the Court’s case law on legal parenthood and crossborder surrogacy is highly problematic from the intended social parent’s
perspective. The exclusive link, recognized by the Court, between the
child and their genetic parent ignores the intended social parent, even
though social parents form a constitutive role in non-traditional families.
The Court’s stance discriminates against the social parent, who has
contributed equally (except for their genetic material) to the couple’s
parental project of creating a family and bringing a child into this world
222. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶ 40 (April 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng-press?i=003-6380685-8364782.
223. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶¶ 54–55; D v. France, App. No. 11288
/18 at ¶ 70.
224. Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
225. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11.
226. Mennesson, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at ¶ 100.
227. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶¶ 54-55; D v. France, App. No. 11288
/18 at ¶ 70.
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through cross-border surrogacy. It also disregards that genetic and social
parents jointly rear a child. The Court’s stance excludes, if not
discriminates against, the social parent who, for either medical (e.g.,
infertility) or biological (in the case of same-sex couples) reasons, cannot
contribute their genetic material.
Alternative means of recognizing the legal parent-child relationship,
such as domestic adoption, are not equivalent to transcription of a birth
certificate established abroad. As Kessler notes, “requiring a same-sex
parent to adopt their own child to be legally recognized as a parent
‘disparages their choices and diminishes their parenthood’ and ‘places the
nonbiological parent in a sort of second-class parental status.’” 228 Kessler
refers to “two-tier parentage” to describe the difference between
establishing legal parenthood by registering foreign birth certificates and
adoption. 229 While the genetically related parent can claim the benefits
and protections attached to the legal recognition of the parent-child
relationship (for themselves and the child) from the very beginning, the
non-genetically related, intended parent has to wait, sometimes for a
prolonged time, to receive the same status. In addition, while secondparent adoption might be readily available for opposite-sex couples, this
is not the case for same-sex couples. In the European context, it is
important to add that second-parent adoption for same-sex couples is still
not legal in thirty out of forty-nine countries. 230 This fact renders void
the ECtHR’s claim that adoption constitutes a valid alternative means of
recognizing the legal parent-child relationship between the child and the
intended social parent.
Looking to the future, one may worry that the power of judicial
discourse, disregarding “the social”, is detrimental to the social parent’s
status in non-traditional families, beyond the initial step from babymaking to family making. In fact, another concerning judicial
phenomenon, reported so far mainly in the United States, involves family
dissolution instead of family creation. This phenomenon includes
custody decision-making in case of separation of parents in nontraditional families. When children are genetically related to only one of
the adults, their relationship with their non-biological parent is at risk of
being involuntarily severed if the adult union dissolves. 231 In her work,
228. Kessler, supra note 6, at 322 (quoting Geri C., Sjoquist, Defining Parenthood: Changing
Families, the Law, and the Element of Intent, 75 Bench & Bar Minn. 16, 18 (2018)).
229. Kessler, supra note 6, at 322.
230. ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map 2020, supra note 18.
231. Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes Between
Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331 (2016), at 331 [hereinafter
Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections].
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Feinberg documents the attitudes of U.S. courts favoring the genetic
parent in divorce proceedings and child custody claims involving nontraditional families. 232 There are no comparable ECtHR cases so far, but
non-traditional family dissolution will eventually come up in Strasbourg.
F. The Distinction Between Legal Motherhood and Fatherhood
The ECtHR distinguishes between the parents’ and the children’s
perspectives when considering the legal parent-child relationship. There
is no symmetry in the protection offered to intended parents and their
children. For intended parents, de facto family life is sufficient, whereas
for the children, recognizing the legal parent-child relationship is
necessary as an essential element of their identity and thus their best
interests. This contradiction is unfortunate. However, the ECtHR’s
precedents go further, touching upon the delicate issue of differentiating
between the recognition of legal fatherhood and legal motherhood.
In Mennesson v. France, 233 Labassee v. France, 234 and the Advisory
Opinion, 235 the Court only referred to legal parenthood without
differentiating between fatherhood and motherhood. 236 It established the
significance of the genetic link in the determination of legal parenthood.
However, in all three instances, the genetically related intended parent
was the children’s father. The Court’s focus on genetics for fatherhood is
unexpected. In European family law, the establishment of legal

232. Id. It is interesting to note that there is sparse empirical evidence pointing in the
opposite direction too. In Israel, for example, the Supreme Court imposed joint
custody, even for a child born after the separation of a same-sex couple, thus favoring
a “continuation of the ‘family story.’. . .” See Lee Yaron, In Israel, Lesbian Ex Wins Joint
Custody of Son Born After Split with Mom, ISR. NEWS (May 3, 2018), [https://perma.cc
/2W8J-V75B].
233. See Mennesson v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
234. See Labassee v. France, App. No.65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145378.
235. See Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 (April 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engpress?i=003-6380685-8364782.
236. See generally Beaumont & Trimmings, Recent Jurisprudence of European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 10 (noting that surprisingly the Court did not explicitly
discuss whether there is a difference between legal fatherhood and legal motherhood
and instead referred to a single concept of parenthood).
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fatherhood primarily relies on marriage or recognition of fatherhood, not
genetics. 237
Legal motherhood traditionally relies on gestation, the birth mother
being the legal mother, or adoption. 238 With regard to motherhood, there
are two notions of “biological” at play, “biological” as in genetic
motherhood, and “biological” as in gestational motherhood (i.e., the
woman who gives birth to a child, independently of her genetic link to
the baby). 239 In the past, traditional motherhood was certain and proven
by giving birth. The birth mother was the biological mother, both in
terms of gestation and genetics, which were intrinsically linked. 240 With
the advent of ART, allowing for the transfer of genetic material from one
woman to another through gamete donation and surrogacy, the biological
truth for motherhood has evolved. The concept of the gestational birth
mother always being the genetic mother has become a legal fiction, as the
two can be distinct. 241
The ECtHR’s precedents in Mennesson v. France 242 and Labassee v.
France 243 left open whether the legal reasoning would have been the same
if the surrogate mother had carried out a pregnancy with an embryo
created with an ovum of the intended mother and a sperm donor. In D
v. France, the Court did not impose domestic registration of the foreign
birth certificate to establish the legal mother-child link with the
genetically related intended mother, as opposed to its decision with regard
to the genetically related father in Mennesson v. France 244 and Labassee v.
France. 245 The Court noted that the child has a right for their genetically
related intended mother to be recognized as their legal mother. 246
However, the Court considered it compatible with the child’s right to
respect for private life that the genetically related mother had to go
through the additional procedural step of adoption to have the legal

237. There is a legal presumption that the man married to the birth mother is the legal
father, even if this might not necessarily reflect the biological truth. On the traditionally
limited role of genetics for establishing legal fatherhood, see DOLGIN, supra note 2, at
134.
238. Storrow, International Surrogacy in the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 6,
at 62.
239. See Mulligan, supra note 6, at 463-64.
240. Id.
241. DOLGIN, supra note 2, at 2.
242. Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11 (June 26, 2014).
243. Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-145378.
244. Mennesson, App. No. 65192/11 at ¶ 100.
245. Labassee, App. No. 65941/11 at ¶ 79.
246. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 64, 70.
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parent-child link recognized, as opposed to the genetically related
father. 247 The latter was recognized through the domestic registration of
his inscription on the foreign birth certificate.
In its Advisory Opinion, the Court had already considered the issue
of adoption, noting that if adoption by the intended mother is effectively
and readily available, there is no need to register the foreign birth
certificate directly. 248 However, the Advisory Opinion dealt with a case in
which the intended mother was not genetically related to the child. 249 In
D v. France, both the intended father and the intended mother were
genetically related to the child and thus in an identical situation. 250 But
the Court still treated them differently with regard to the recognition of
the legal parent-child relationship (direct recognition versus recognition
through adoption). Pushing for the registration of foreign birth
certificates designating the intended genetic father, while accepting that
the intended genetic mother must adopt her child, equates to gender
discrimination, which is incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. The
ECtHR only briefly mentioned this concern in D v. France. 251 It did not
address, however, the flagrant gender discrimination, as the claimants
themselves did not raise the point. 252 The Court simply acknowledged
that the intended genetic mother might find it difficult to consider going
through an adoption procedure to establish legal parenthood for her
genetic child under domestic law. 253 However, the Court was unwilling
to interfere in this matter on procedural grounds.
A feminist critique of the ECtHR’s stance in D v. France goes
beyond the scope of this paper. 254 A few thoughts are nevertheless crucial
247. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 66, 70.
248. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶¶ 54-55 (April 10, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-6380685-8364782.
249. Advisory Opinion, App. No. P16-2018-001 at ¶¶ 27-28.
250. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 1–10.
251. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 81-82.
252. In D v. France, the claimants only raised violations of the child’s right to respect for
private life and right to non-discrimination, and not possible rights violations of the
intended genetic mother. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 61.
253. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 63.
254. For an overview of the literature on feminist critiques of ART, see LAURA M. PURDY,
REPRODUCING PERSONS: ISSUES IN FEMINIST BIOETHICS (1996); REPRODUCTION,
ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); EMILY
MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION (rev.
ed. 2001); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2000) (1989); Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique
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here. First of all, the Court’s position is incoherent with regard to the role
of genetics for the child’s identity. As Mulligan notes, “the genetic
relationship between a genetic father and a genetic mother and his or her
child is precisely the same. Each shares 50% of the child’s DNA.” 255 If
this relationship is so significant regarding the genetic father and
constitutes, as the Court recognizes, an essential element of the child’s
identity and thus its best interests, this relationship is equally important
with regard to the genetic mother. If the legal recognition of biological
truth is an essential element of the child’s identity when it comes to the
genetic father, as the Court argues, then the same must be true regarding
the genetic mother. The child’s identity is as intensely connected to the
genetic mother as it is with regard to the genetic father.
Furthermore, the ECtHR’s conclusion in D v. France 256 that
adoption produces similar effects to registering the foreign birth
certificate is unconvincing. While it may be true that at the end of an
adoption procedure, the child’s status and its legal parenthood relations
are the same, adoption is not a simple formality. The additional
procedural step of adoption imposed on the genetic mother represents a
significant hurdle, as adoption can be lengthy and costly. 257 Second
parent adoption usually requires “hiring an attorney, paying court fees,
executing various documents, submitting to background checks, and
appearing in court.” 258 During the adoption process and until the
authorities reach a decision, the adopting parent is considered “a legal
stranger to the child” and thus in a vulnerable position. 259 Feinberg is
adamant that the legal means for establishing legal parenthood—direct
recognition, voluntary acknowledgment, or adoption—are not

255.
256.
257.
258.

259.

of Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992); SOPHIE LEWIS, FULL SURROGACY
NOW: FEMINISM AGAINST FAMILY (2019); Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children,
Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for Progressive Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in
the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1077 (2014); IDEOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES
OF MOTHERHOOD: RACE, CLASS, SEXUALITY, NATIONALISM (Heléna Ragoné &
France Winddance Twine eds., 2000); Storrow, Quests for Conception, supra note 9.
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 470.
D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 66.
Kessler, supra note 6, at 322.
Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood
Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent
Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 81 (2017) [hereinafter Feinberg, Whither the Functional
Parent].
Id. at 82.
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equivalent from the perspective of equal treatment of all the intended
parents involved even they eventually may produce the same result. 260
The ECtHR’s assertion that adoption produces the same result for
the parent-child-relationship as direct recognition and registration of the
foreign birth certificate ignores the elements of power and control over
legal motherhood at play in adoption processes. Adoption requires
examining the genetic mother’s fitness to be a legal mother and a child’s
best interests evaluation. 261 The Court acknowledges this additional layer
of control and praises it, thus reiterating the focus on the child’s best
interests. Such an interest evaluation does not occur when legal
parenthood for the genetic father is established by registering the foreign
birth certificate. The genetic father’s fitness for legal fatherhood is not
examined at any point. There is no verification if the legal recognition of
the link between the child and the genetic father corresponds to the
child’s best interests.
Finally, what about parity of reasoning? 262 A man can establish a
father-child relationship via evidence derived from blood testing. Thus,
parity of reasoning suggests that blood testing can also be conclusive for
the determination of motherhood. Of course, such an approach implies
a new, genetic testing involving, interpretation of the age-old adage that
the mother is always certain—mater semper certa est. If the law recognizes
genetic testing as a valid means to determine fatherhood, it should
recognize genetic testing to determine motherhood as well, independently
of who has given birth to the child and without imposing the additional
procedural step of adoption. 263
The power struggle behind the domestic authorities’ refusal to
directly recognize a birth certificate established abroad is about
maintaining obstacles to a practice—surrogacy—that is considered illegal
in a domestic context and that morally is still condemned in most of
260. Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent, supra note 258, at 58; Feinberg, Consideration
of Genetic Connections, supra note 231, at 375; Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra
note 179, at 105.
261. Kathryn Webb Bradley, Surrogacy and Sovereignty: Safeguarding the Interests of Both the
Child and the State, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2018).
262. For a critique of parity of reasoning, see Bender, supra note 14; Hendricks, supra note
183.
263. This is the case in Israel for example. Following a court decision, the intended mother
of a child born through surrogacy can complete a DNA test to confirm her link to the
child. Legal motherhood in such a case is established based on genetic testing. The Tel
Aviv Family Court judge in this case noted “that a biological mother must adopt her
natural children, is intolerable and defies common sense.” See Dana Weiler-Polak,
Israeli Moms Won’t Have to Adopt Babies Born to Surrogates, HAARETZ (Mar. 7, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/8PSX-58CB].
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Europe, based on arguments such as the commercialization of
motherhood and the vulnerability of surrogate mothers. 264 However, it is
inappropriate to pursue this public order or public policy purpose in a
gender-discriminatory manner and at the cost of the child’s best interests.
As the Court rightly recognized in its Advisory Opinion, 265 there are many
interests attached to the recognition of the legal parent-child relationship
between the mother and the child. The additional step that adoption
imposes may well harm the child’s interests.
Though the ECtHR refused to address possible discrimination
against the intended genetic mother in D v. France, it nevertheless hinted
to the absurdity of the situation by noting that as the child’s genetic
parent, the intended mother might find it difficult to consider going
through an adoption procedure to establish a parenthood link with her
child under French law. 266 This indicates that the Court might have
decided differently if the claimants had raised their allegations as to a
violation of Article 14 ECHR with regard to the mother’s rights in a
procedurally proper manner. Considering the facts of the case and the
domestic authorities’ actions, it is difficult to imagine how the
government’s actions would not constitute gender discrimination and,
thus, a violation of Article 8 in combination with Article 14 ECHR.
Beyond the cross-border surrogacy cases discussed in this paper,
open questions remain within the context of ART and legal motherhood.
What about egg donation, not in the context of surrogacy but as another
type of ART procedure for couples desiring to have a child? What about
cases of errors in domestic ART treatments, such as in the Italian IVF
clinic mix-up case that reached the ECtHR, where embryos were
switched and implanted in the wrong mothers who were seeking fertility
treatments in the same clinic? 267 Who is the legal mother there, the
264. See Ní Shúilleabháin, supra note 9, at 105; Beaumont & Trimmings, supra note 10, at
240; Gruenbaum, supra note 14, at 495; Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note
9, at 143.
265. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangement Abroad and the Intended Mother, Requested by the French Court of
Cassation, App. No. P16-2018-001 (April 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engpress?i=003-6380685-8364782.
266. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶ 63.
267. See X and Y v. Italy, App. No. 41146/14, (Sept. 16, 2014), [https://perma.cc/6N7L6P7R]. The embryos of the applicants in the case were mistakenly implanted in a
different mother following an error that occurred at an Italian IVF clinic. X and Y v.
Italy, App. No. 41146/14 at 1–2. The biological parents brought the case to the
ECtHR after a judge in Rome ruled that the children must stay with their birth mother,
as per Italian law. X and Y v. Italy, App. No. 41146/14 at 2. The ECtHR dismissed
the case because the couple had not exhausted all the possibilities provided under
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woman who gives birth, or the genetically related woman? Linking
motherhood to genetics opens up a pandora’s box of normative questions
and addressing those questions is beyond the scope of this paper. The
interactions between the adage that the mother is always certain—mater
semper certa est—and genetics are a topic of ongoing legal theoretical
debate. 268 However, normative uncertainty about how to define legal
motherhood does not temper the gender discrimination condoned by the
ECtHR’s decision in D v. France, which allowed the genetically related
father to be recognized as the legal father from the beginning, with all the
benefits and protections that go with this status, while the genetically
related mother had to undergo the process of domestic adoption to
achieve the same status. 269
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a biological reality of conceiving a child and a social reality
relating to concepts of family and parenthood. These concepts have been
changing over time. There are increasing societal tendencies toward
embracing non-traditional families, facilitated by ART and the
tremendous progress achieved and still ongoing. Today, many
combinations of genetic, gestational, and social parenthood exist. Judicial
recognition of non-traditional families can support this social change and
push for democratically legitimized law reform by the legislature. This
trend towards family diversity and pluralism has been accompanied by an
emphasis on respect for human rights, including the right to respect for
family life and gender and sexual equality.270 However, the scope of
liberalization and inclusiveness is limited. As Dolgin notes:
[T]he law’s developing recognition of individualism and
choice in the creation and operation of families has limited
Italian legislation for the recognition of their rights. X and Y v. Italy, App. No. 41146
/14 at 3. For a critical analysis, see Bender, supra note 14 (on these mix-up cases);
Hendricks, supra note 183 (on the issue of genetic essentialism).
268. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 14; DOLGIN, supra note 2; Gruenbaum, supra note 14;
Cahn, Uncertain Legal Basis, supra note 8; Margalit et al., The New Frontier, supra note
14; Mykitiuk, supra note 7; Robinson & Miller, supra note 14; Garrison, The
Technological Family, supra note 14; Anderson, supra note 14; Meyer, supra note 14;
Garrison, The Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 2; Bender, supra note 14;
Baker, supra note 14; Kessler, supra note 6; NeJaime, Nature of Parenthood, supra note
2; Blecher-Prigat, supra note 14.
269. D v. France, App. No. 11288/18 at ¶¶ 81–82.
270. Büchler, supra note 15, at 30–35.
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itself to relationships between adults (especially spouses and
cohabitants) within families. With regard to the parent-child
connection, the law has been much slower to accept change.
But disputes occasioned by reproductive technology often
involve questions about parentage.… 271
The relationship between the intended social parent and the child is often
left without legal protection, even when the legal relationship between
the parents is recognized. A genetically unrelated parent in nontraditional families created through ART is legally part of the family, but
their role as a legal parent remains precarious.
This paper tells a story of shifting normativities, from tradition to
modernity and back, with regard to the recognition of legal parenthood
in non-traditional families created through cross-border surrogacy. The
cross-border element is a forced element. Couples and individuals must
travel abroad because most domestic legal frameworks in Europe still
restrict the creation of non-traditional families through ART. Once back
home, these families face a situation of legal limbo regarding the
children’s status and their legal parenthood. The ECtHR agrees with the
need to rectify this situation but, in parallel, fills the legal limbo with
genetic essentialism and allows for gender discrimination when
recognizing legal parenthood. When discussing the recognition of birth
certificates for children born through cross-border surrogacy, the ECtHR
relies on the genetic parent-child link as an essential element of the child’s
identity. The Court also underlines the connection between genetics and
the child’s best interests.
The traditional “nuclear ideal” of the family offers clarity in the
assignment of parenthood and its rights. With the combination of ART
and cross-border fertility services, a blurring of lines occurs as family
diversity becomes more prevalent. At the same time, the reality depicted
by genetics does not allow for blurred lines. On the contrary, genetics
testing can determine genetic parenthood with precision. One might
argue that the ECtHR’s reasoning and its focus on genetic relatedness can
be explained with the search for clarity in the context of fluid, nontraditional family forms. The technologies of genetic testing provide
certainty.
A dichotomy thus becomes apparent between assisted reproductive
technologies and services, allowing for the creation of a more plural and
diversified social reality including non-traditional families, and genetic

271. DOLGIN, supra note 2, at 32.
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technologies, serving as a tool nudging towards a narrower legal definition
of the parent-child relationship based on verifiable genetic relatedness.
The new status quo brought about by the ECtHR’s precedents is
problematic. Biological realities are not a natural blueprint for social
reality. Biological classifications are but one factor in defining social
classifications. 272 Campbell pinpoints that “[i]n circumstances involving
assisted reproduction, identifying biology as a basis for [the legal parentchild link] seems perplexing, given that the point of using reproductive
materials or services from third parties is to acquire parental status even
where one cannot rely (or chooses not to rely) on biological/’natural’
methods of procreation.” 273 The normative power of biological reality or
biological truth created by genetic parent-child links is overrun by the
social reality of family pluralism brought about by ART and cross-border
reproductive services. The ECtHR’s adherence to genetic essentialism in
the recognition of the legal parent-child relationship sidelines other
essential elements of a child’s identity and best interests. 274
The law must consider the lived diversity of families and thus
accommodate not only the majority, but also the minority cases, without
discrimination. In its recent case law, the ECtHR insists that it is
necessary to ensure that a child is not disadvantaged because they were
conceived through ART and cross-border surrogacy. 275 However, the
ECtHR’s focus on genetics allows the method of reproduction used by
the intended parents to determine the child’s status and legal rights and
the recognition of legal parenthood. 276 The Court does not take

272. The understanding that biology is not the sole criteria for determining parent-child
relationships is reflected in existing, traditional legal rules such as the marital
presumption rule, or legal presumption of fatherhood in marriage, creating a “legal
fiction” of biological fatherhood in marriage. See R. Alta Charo, Biological Truths and
Legal Fictions, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 301 (1998).
273. Campbell, supra note 14, at 259.
274. Caulfield, supra note 15, at 100. As Charo notes: “A child needs protection. The law
is there to identify the adults who will provide it. Biology may tell us who birthed the
child, and whose egg provided the maternal DNA. But this is neither necessary nor
sufficient to determine whom the law should call a mother.” See Charo, supra note 272,
at 327.
275. The ECtHR relied on the same line of arguments in another area of family law, such
as with regard to “illegitimate” children, i.e., children born outside of wedlock. It was
the judiciary that played the most significant role in addressing the status of
“illegitimate” children and the discrimination against nonmarital children that lingered
in the latter half of the twentieth century. On the ECtHR’s role in this context, see
Storrow, Proportionality Problem, supra note 9, at 143.
276. In his concurring opinion in Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, Judge Lemmens notes that
“I wonder whether the legal limbo in which a child finds [them]self can be justified on
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intentionality and the intended social parent’s role under consideration.
This undermines the child’s best interests, recognized as predominant by
the same Court.
The child’s best interests standard requires that courts balance
different factors: the biological parent does not receive an automatic or
exclusive preference. Mulligan argues, “intention is an essential aspect of
parenthood in assisted reproduction, and thus the relationship to the
intended parent should be captured by the Article 8 right to identity.” 277
The standard of intention does not necessarily directly focus on the child’s
best interests. 278 However, it is fair to assume that the individuals who are
at the origin of creating a non-traditional family through the means of
cross-border surrogacy will assume their role as parents and act in the
child’s best interests, whether they are genetically related to the child or
not. 279
Children in non-traditional families, conceived through ART or
surrogacy and born abroad, have the right to equal legal protection as
other children in the domestic context. This protection should include
the guarantee that civil status documents (i.e., birth certificates) of these
children are recognized in all Member States of the Council of Europe,
regardless of whether they provide access to specific ART and surrogacy
in a purely domestic context. The recognition of a legal relationship with
both parents, genetic or social, not only protects the child’s identity but
is also directly relevant to other interests and rights such as citizenship,
welfare benefits, security in case of death or separation of the parents, and
inheritance.
The ECtHR demands that recognition of the legal parent-child
relationship with the second intended parent (the mother) has to be
effectively and readily available through adoption. 280 However, it turns a
blind eye to several crucial issues for non-traditional families created
through ART abroad. Accepting adoption as an additional procedural
step creates an obstacle for recognizing the social parent, who plays an
equal role in the creation of non-traditional families. The Court’s position

277.
278.
279.
280.

the basis of the conduct of [their] intended parents or with reference to the moral views
prevailing in society.” Valdís Fjölnisdóttir v. Iceland, App. No. 71552/17 at K4.
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 472.
Maule & Schmid, supra note 15, at 477.
Id.
Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal ParentChild Relationship Between a Child Born Through a Gestational Surrogacy
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also imposes an element of power and control over the recognition of legal
motherhood, an element not imposed as such on legal fatherhood. This
element of power and control in recognizing legal motherhood can hardly
be justified based on protecting the child’s best interests. Imposing an
additional evaluation, as to a genetic mother’s fitness to be a legal mother,
constitutes discrimination based on gender, in violation of Articles 8 and
14 ECHR.
Eventually, the issues decided by the Court go beyond family and
recognition of legal parent-child relationships. They also speak to the
political relationship between citizens and the polity and how
membership in this polity is defined in a European context. 281 Lastly,
Bradley notes, regarding the trajectory of the ECtHR’s reasoning and its
implications, “The state has the right and responsibility to define
citizenship and parentage, to protect children within its borders, and to
enact policies and laws, including those relating to surrogacy, that fulfill
these sovereign duties.” 282 Bradley further explains that “[e]xpecting
individuals who wish to assume legal responsibility for a particular child
to demonstrate that they are entitled to do so—whether by birth,
genetics, or other means—is within the authority and responsibility of
the state.” 283
In fulfilling these sovereign duties, the child’s best interests must be
considered, and genetic essentialism is not necessarily in the child’s best
interests. How the law conceives families is not a scientific inquiry looking
for biological truth. While genetic connections will likely always be
meaningful to parents and children alike, they are not all that matters for
parenthood. Intention is an essential aspect of parenthood in assisted
reproduction and families created through these technologies. The
relationship to the intended social parent should thus be recognized in an
equal manner.284 In fulfilling its sovereign duties, the state has to impose
rules and procedures that guarantee equal treatment to intended mothers
and fathers and equal treatment to genetic and social parents. Only if the
law becomes aware of all the dimensions of non-traditional families can
the child’s best interests be fully respected. •
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